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ABSTRACT
Since the death of Generalissimo Francisco Franco in
November 1975, Spain has undergone a remarkable political
transformation in which King Juan Carlos I, Franco's hand-
picked successor, inherited the authoritarian powers of a
dictator and promptly used them to turn his country into a
constitutional monarchy rooted in liberal democratic principles.
The initial phase of Spain's democratic evolution was
characterized by euphoria and good will in which a series of
firm and decisive steps were taken to replace the old regime
with new democratic institutions and norms. Since 1979, how-
ever, the pace of Spain's democratic progress has slowed, as
the problems of regional autonomy, terrorism, and a disaffected
military have threatened to disrupt Spain's democratic evolu-
tion. Prime Minister Suarez' abrupt resignation in January
19 81 and the military coup attempt a month later brought into
sharp focus the fragile state of Spain's democracy.
The present government has pursued a mixed program of
reform and appeasement to defuse the danger of a military
takeover in Spain. Elements within the Spanish military,
however, remain a potential threat to Spanish democracy.
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I. INTRODUCTION; SPAIN'S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
On December 27, 19 78, three years after the death of
Generalissimo Francisco Franco, King Juan Carlos I of Spain
signed into law his country's new constitution, a document
drawn up over the preceeding eighteen months by Spain's first
freely elected assembly in more than forty years. This act
was the culmination of a remarkable process in which, as one
observer remarked, "a King inherited the authoritarian powers
of a dictator and promptly used them to turn his country into
a democracy." [1]
The promulgation of a new constitution was an initial,
albeit fundamental, step in Spain's democratic transition.
This transition is on-going as the Spanish people continue to
struggle with the problems associated with their country's
turn toward liberal democracy. It is the intent of this
thesis to examine the viability of Spanish democracy and
assess the impact of the Spanish military on its prospects
for continued success. As an introduction, this chapter will
briefly summarize Spain's political development since the
-death of Franco and identify those problems which continue to
threaten Spain's democratic evolution. To fully appreciate
Spain's remarkable political transformation, however, an
understanding of the Franco regime's impact on Spanish society
is required.

A. THE FRANCO LEGACY
The roots of the Franco regime lie within the Spanish
Civil War (1936-39), that bloody conflict which pitted Spaniard
against Spaniard and polarized all of Europe. To Franco, the
Civil War was a crusade to free Spain from her contamination
by everything that was non-Spanish. As E. Ramon Arango wrote,
"he (Franco) resembled nothing so much as a man from the Re-
conquest, ridding Spain not of the Moor and of the Jew, but
of the Republic, the liberal, the capitalist, the communist,
the freemason, and the athiest." [2]
In order to impart an aura of legitimacy to his regime
following his Civil War victory. Franco condemned and denigrated
the Second Republic (19 31-36) for its failures and exceses.
The Second Republic was presented by Francois t propaganda as
the culmination of a period of national decline and disinte-
gration that began in the 19th century. It was portrayed as
the epitome of the social, economic and politcal vices assoc-
iated with liberal democracies and as a regime which encouraged
the importation of foreign ideologies such as liberalism, social-
ism, and anarchism, that were at conflict with "traditional"
Spanish values. The Civil War, on the other hand, was glori-
fied as the crusade that purged Spain of these infectuous
elements, resisted the Communist threat to Spain and Western
Europe, and saved the country and Christianity. [3]

The Franco regime started by rejecting the principles of
liberal democracy and adhering to the fascist doctrine of the
Falange. A totalitarian dictatorship replaced the Second
Republic, political parties were banned and a single-party
system was instituted. The Catholic Church regained the
temporal powers it had lost under the Republic and the Armed
Forces regained their militaristic role in preserving the
national unity of Spain.
Following World War II, however, the Spanish regime found
that it had to co-exist with countries governed according to
democratic principles. Accordingly, the regime began to
change, and slowly, but steadily, evolved in a more moderate
direction divesting itself of certain totalitarian and re-
pressive trappings that it featured in earlier years. In the
process it emerged as an authoritarian state distinct at once
from both totalitarian and democratic political systems.
Franco's authoritarian regime incorporated a political system
which allowed an element of limited political pluralism (re-
flected in institutions such as the Catholic Church, the syn-
dicates, and the military); which lacked a guiding ideology
but instead nurtured an ill-defined "mentality" that was more
emotional than objective; and which was characterized by the
lack of extensive and intensive political mobilization of
the population. Its only political organization the National
Movement, did not monopolize access to power, but instead
served as a tool for those in control. [4]

During the 19 50's and the 19 60 's, Franco attempted to
fashion a democratic mask for a Spain to cover the more author-
itarian aspects of his regime. Franco knew full well, however,
that any political evolution in Spain would be narrowly con-
strained by the falangist mentality he had embraced. To
justify his regime's reactionary character and to further
cement its legitimacy, Franco emphasized the so-called
"originality of Spanish democracy." As Jose Amodia explained,
Spain was not the same as other nations and therefore
had a 'democratic system* which suited her idiosyncra-
cies. Spanish demiocracy is not a form of liberal
democracy, but that does not make it any less demo-
cratic. The Spanish character is bedeviled by certain
failings - 'demonios familiares' as Franco would call
them - such as individualism, lack of solidarity, and
extremism that makes it incompatible with liberal
democracy as understood in Western Europe. [5]
The democracy that Franco would give to Spain would be, in
his eyes at least, tailor-made to the temperament of the people
Spain, therefore, underwent what the Franco regime liked
to interpret as an evolutionary change, a change from an overt
dictatorship to what has been called by several political
analysts a "facade democracy." [6] The regime recognized
the need for change, or at least the perception of change,
not only to maintain some resemblance of popularity at home,
but also to improve its degree of acceptance abroad. Change
and progress throughout the Franco era, however, was uneven-
among the various sectors of Spanish society. Whereas during
the Second Republic the political structure was far ahead of
the socio-economic infrastructure, under Franco, Spain's
10

socio-economic evolution outpaced its political evolu-
tion.
Spain's post-war isolation did little to improve the
Spanish economy already devastated by the Civil War. Even
during the 1950 's when United States - Spanish relations
improved, American aid to Spain had little economic impact,
and by 1957 the Spanish economy was near bankruptcy. The
introduction of politically aseptic experts into the Franco
cabinet in 19 57, however, along with a currency devaluation,
the implementation of an economic stabilization plan and
membership in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) , the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) , launched Spain on an economic recovery. [7]
Following an IBRD recommendation in 19 62 that the time
was right for development, the "Comisaria del Plan de Desarollo,"
a new government department charged with planning and c o-
ordinating Spain's economic growth, promulgated three four-year
plans, (1964-67, 1968-71, 1972-75), which were to serve as
the economic guidelines for the remainder of the Franco era.
For the most part, these programs were successful, and Spain
was transformed from an underdeveloped agrarian country into
a growing, industrial society. Major economic indicators such
as national and personal income, foreign trade, treasury
reserves, food consumption, production, and housing showed
healthy increases throughout the 1960 's as a measure of pros-
perity came to the Spanish people. [8]
11

Accompanying Spain's growing economic prosperity during
this period was a mass movement of population. Peasants from
the countryside migrated to the growing industrial urban
centers. Spanish workers emigrated to more affluent Western
European countries, relieving Spain of unemployment problems.
and foreign tourists flocked to Spain on a massive scale.
These movements were encouraged by the Franco government to
aid Spain's economic growth (which they did) but they also
had other far reaching consequences.
The growing contact of Spaniards with other Europeans who
enjoyed greater freedoms, the intermingling of Spanish workers
with their foreign counterparts who had their own independent
trade unions to look after their interests, and the coming
of age of a new generation of Spaniards who were less attached
to the regime and more receptive to ideas from abroad, created
an ever increasing sector of the populace who began to question
the idiosyncracies of Spain's political and social system.
Jose Amodia observes that "they expected a rational and con-
vincing answers and appeals to traditional values and demogogic
slogans along the lines of 'we are different' or 'we are
better' would no longer satisfy." [9]
What one saw developing in Spain at this time was a re-
emergence of the political consciousness of the people. To
understand the significance of this phenomenon, one must
realize that throughout the Franco era, the political develop-
ment of the Spanish people had been ignored or consciously
12

inhibited. Political changes that were made had neither the
aim nor the effect of giving Spaniards a greater share and
freer hand in running their own country, an essential condi-
tion for real political development. So-called progressive
moves such as the Press Law of 1966, were designed to improve
the regime's democratic facade without endangering its mono-
poly of power.
The Franco regime as alluded to previously has been
characterized by many analysts, J. Linz in particular, as
being authoritarian, that is, seeking to maintain or restore
traditional patterns of authority through the demobilization
of the populace, or, in other words, depoliticizing the
Spanish people. [10] The Franco regime did not attempt to
mobilize the masses, but instead seemed to be quite content
with passive support, preferring its citizens to be politically
apathetic. To this end it has managed "to inculcate or at
least reinforce a disdain for political parties and politicians
as well as a low interest in civic and political affairs."
[11]
At the time of Franco's death, however, Spain had outgrown
the dictator's thirty-six year old authoritarian state. It
had become an urban industrial nation whose people were con-
scious of the political and social freedoms enjoyed by other
Europeans but denied to them. Spain had become prosperous,
optimistic and restless for political change. The political
system of Franco, with its repression of dissent, its fascist
13

labor syndicates, its phoney elections and one sided referenda,
its feeble Cortes and its adulation of a remote, cold leader,
no longer felt comfortable. [12] Spain was ready for change
a change that the Franco regime, shackled by an outdated
political philosophy, could not provide.
B. KING JUAN CARLOS I AND DEMOCRATIC CHANGE
^^en change did come to Spain following Franco's death,
it was not revolutionary change; instead it was a change
accomplished from within the system by Franco's heirs rather
than his opponents. What occurred was a peaceful transition
from a personalist, authoritarian dictatorship to a constitu-
tional monarchy rooted in liberal democratic principles.
Two men were largely responsible for the political trans-
formation of Spain into a modern democratic state. King Juan
Carlos I, Franco's hand-picked successor, and Aldolfo Suarez,
the former Secretary General of Franco's ruling National Move-
ment. Both men, though not zealous reformers when Franco
was alive, were nonetheless committed to the establishment of
democratic institutions in Spain after his death.
The process of transition to democracy in Spain can be
divided into three great -phases or periods. The first phase
encompassed that period from the death of Franco to the first
parliamentary elections in June 1977. During this period,
King Juan Carlos and Suarez, his appointed Premier, led the
reform of oolitical institutions within the general framework
14

of laws and institutions left them by Franco. Their reforms
were nonetheless impressive. All in all, through decree,
referendum, and legislation, they legalized political parties
including the Communist party, abolished Franco's National
Movement, legalized independent trade unions, abolished the
largely appointed Francois t legislature and replaced it with
a freely elected, bicameral Cortes, convoked partisan elections
and allowed freedom of speech and assembly in electoral
campaigns. [13]
The Spanish political scene following Franco's death was
dominated by a struggle between three fundamental groups,
those who sought to impose a "ruptura" (or break) with the
Francoist past, those who advocated "reforma", insisting that
the change come from within the system, and those who wanted
"continuismo" with the past. [14] As one can deduce, Suarez
and his "Union del Centre Democratico" (Union of Democratic
Center or UCD) party took the "reforma" side of the question.
Advocates of "ruptura" were represented by the Spanish Left,
primarily the "Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol" (Socialist
Workers Party or ?SOE) headed by Felipe Gonzalez and the
"Partido Comunista de Espana" (Communist Party of Spain or
PCE) led by Santiago Carrillo. Those desiring "continuismo"
identified with the "Alianza Popular" (Popular Alliance or
AP) headed by former Interior Minister Manuel Fraga Iribarne.
It is evident that advocates of reform. King Juan Carlos
and Suarez, won out during this first phase of Spain's
15

democratic transition. The political expression of the re-
formist victory was Suarez's triumph in the June 19 77 elections
for the new Cortes which was empowered to write Spain's new
constitution. Suarez's center-right UCD party garnered
thirty-four percent of the vote and 165 seats in the Congress
of Deputies. The socialist PSOE was second, twenty-nine per-
cent of the vote/118 seats, followed by the PCE, 9.2 percent
of the vote/twenty seats, and the right wing AP, 8.4 percent/
sixteen seats. [15]
As the election results indicated, the Spanish people
wanted nothing to do with "continuismo" and the old regime.
What emerged was a right-of-center minority government headed
by Suarez with its principal opposition coming from the
socialist left. It was evident, however, that the "ruptura"
parties were in no position to impose a new system overnight.
This was partly due to internal disagreements over strategy,
partly to a lack of legitimacy with the populace and partly
to a lack of access to the levers of power. Furthermore,
their very participation in the elections was a concession
to reform and put them on the defensive against Suarez's
political momentum.
The period from June 19 77 to the approval of the new
constitution by referendum in December 19 78 and the subsequent
parliamentary elections in March 19 79 marked a second phase
in Spain's democratic transition. This period, in which
Suarez engineered a consensus broad enough to draft a new
16

constitution, was marked by euphoria and good will in which
Spanish leaders of nearly all political persuasions took a
series of firm and decisive steps in order to replace the old
regime with robust new democratic institutions and norms. In
October 19 77, for example, Suarez's ruling UCD along with the
AP, ?CE, and PSOE agreed to a political truce and a common
economic policy, (the Moncloa Pact) , while the new constitu-
tion was being drawn up. Furthermore, all four parties played
an active role in the referendum campaign advocating a fa-
vorable and massive vote by the Spanish electorate on the new
constitution. [17] The positive (eighty-eight percent) vote
in favor of the constitution contrasted sharply with the deep
cleavage in Spanish society created by Spain's last consti-
tution which founded the Second Republic.
As mentioned previously, the King signed the Constitution
into law on December 27, 1978. Two days later Suarez called
for new parliamentary elections to be held on March 1 19 79.
This move caught the leftist opposition by surprise since
they expected Suarez to hang on to power after the Constitu-
tion had been promulgated for the full four-year term to
which he was entitled. As a result, the opposition parties
had little time to organize or raise money for the campaign
As shown in Table 1, the outcome of the March elections was
almost a carbon copy of the results of 19 77. [18]
Since Suarez's re-election in 19 79, which marks the
beginning of the third stage of Spain's transition, the pace
17

Table 1: Spanish Election Results
Congress of Deputies [19]
Major parties Number of seats
June 19 77 March 19 79
UCD 165 168
PSOE 118 121
PCE 20 23
AP 16 9
of democratic progress has slowed. Having solved many of
the structural problems of democracy, Spain's politicians
seemed unable to agree on the broad direction the new system
should take. According to Meir Serfaty, "the very vigor and
single-mindedness with which the fundamental change was
carried out precluded any concerted effort to tackle other
problems that needed attention," such as the economy, terror-
ism, and the question of autonomy and regional devolution.
[20]
It also became evident that the euphoria over democracy
was subsiding. The voter absentee rate began to rise, and
with the Cortes now having to flesh out the skeleton provided
by the constitution, conflicts came to the fore. With these
conflicts, the traditional political cleavages of Spain, be-
t-//een right and left and between the geographic center and
periphery emerged despite efforts toward accommodation and
consensual politics. At the same time, the disdain for

political parties and politicians, nurtured during the Franco
era, resurfaced and began to work against the consolidation
of democracy once the initial excitement had passed.' [21]
C. PROBLEMS FACING DEMOCRATIC SPAIN TODAY
By the end of 19 80, a stagnating economy, terrorism, and
a restless military had placed Prime Minister Suarez in a
politically uncomfortable position. His leadership was under
fire not only from the opposition parties of the left and
right, but also from within his own party which was beginning
to lose its cohesiveness in the face of Spain's mounting
political problems. Perhaps feeling that he no longer enjoyed
the confidence of the King or his party, Suarez resigned as
Spain's Prime Minister in January 1981.
His c±)rupt resignation left a political vacuum which his
nominated successor, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, had difficulty
filling. Calvo Sotelo' s failure to gain parliamentary endorse-
ment of his government on the first attempt and the attempted
military coup which followed shortly thereafter brought into
sharp focus the fragile state of Spain's young democracy.
Underlying this fragility and threatening the continued via-
bility of Spanish democracy are several fundamental problems
that the government has failed to satisfactorily address.
Central to the concerns of nearly all Spaniards is the
state of the Spanish economy. The prosperous growth years
of the 196C's and early 1970 's have given way to economic
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stagnation. Since Suarez's re-election in March 1979, the
Spanish economy has suffered many setbacks. The estimated
growth rate in 19 80 was 0.8 percent, below the 1979 figure
of 1.4 percent. The country's external debt showed a dismal
five billion dollar deficit in 1980 with Spain forced to
spend over twelve billion dollars a year for oil, the biggest
foreign expenditure. [22]
By far the most serious economic problem is unemployment.
With the rest of Western Europe suffering an economic reces-
sion, Spanish workers have been forced to return home, and
along with Spain's own recession, have added to the ranks of
the unemployed. Currently, Spain has the lowest employment
levels of any country in the Organizational for Economic
Development (OECD) with over twelve percent of its work force
unable to find jobs. (Table 2)
Table 2: Unemployment in Spain
(percent of work force) [23]
1975 4.0 1978 7.5 1981
(1st quarter) 13.6
1976 5.0 1979 9.2
1977 5.7 1980 11.8
Although most Spaniards recognize that their economic
plight is not unique in the Western world, and they are pre-
pared to endure hard times, the state of economy may exacer-
bate other tensions that are threatening political stability
in Spain. [24] Worsening economic conditions will only add
20

to social and political unrest and make the Government's task
much more difficult in dealing with terrorism, regional autonomy,
a restless military and other problems that threaten to under-
mine the nation's accomplishments of the past five years.
Clearly, a principal threat to Spanish democracy is terror-
ism. Basque nationalists of the military wing of the "Euzkadi
ta Askatasuna" (Basque Homeland and Liberty) or ETA and other
extremist groups of both the Right and the Left share the
common goal of bringing down Spain's democracy. All appear
eager to provoke the Spanish Armed Forces into overthrowing
the democratic regime, sparking the kind of tit-for-tat kill-
in g that led to the Civil War. According to the Economist
,
all want another dictatorship, the Right for its own sake and
the Left because its supporters think it "will provoke a popu-
lar uprising that will plunge Spain into a Marxist, Leninist,
Trots kyite Maoist paradise." [25]
The most persistent and effective terrorist group plaguing
Spain are the ETA militants. By conducting a campaign of
terror and bloodshed they hope to provoke a right-wing back-
lash in Spain that will bring down democracy and, with a
twisted sense of logic, justify their resistance to what they
perceive to be an inherently fascist Spain. A strong reaction
by Spain's military and internal security forces against what
they perceive to be a growing lack of law and order in Spain,
would build, according to ETA theorists, popular resentment
for far-off Madrid and increase the separtist yearnings of
21

the historically disaffected Basques. By goading the military
into a right-wing coup, the ETA's claim that peaceful reform
is impossible under Spanish democracy would be buttressed.
The fact that one of the principal demands of the rebellious
members of the Spanish Guardia Civil, who attempted the Febru-
ary 27, 19 81 coup, was more freedom to combat Basque terrorism
lends considerable weight to the ETA's tactics.
The issue of Basque terrorism is complex and must be under-
stood within the larger issue of regional autonomy in Spain.
It is essential, for example, to understand that for centuries
the centrifugal force of Spain's cultural diversity has worked
against Madrid's attempt to mold a national unity. Franco's
answer to this problem was to suppress all tendencies toward
diversity and political autonomy. Infused wish fascist ideas
about the glorification of the national state and intent on
punishing the two regions that opposed him most steadfastly
during the Civil War, Franco was determined to stamp out Basque
and Catalan nationalism and culture. [26] Under Franco the
military and Spain's internal security forces had a primary
mission of preserving the national unity. The Guardia Civil,
it has been remarked, behaved more like an army of occupation
than a police force and was considered to be the ETA's best
recruiting agency. [27]
After Franco's death and spurred by the early developments
toward democracy at the national level, regional groups began
to demand a measure of autonomy from a traditional, centralist
22

state. The new Constitution provided mechanisms for the
granting of regional autonomy, and in 19 79 autonomy was granted
to both the Basque and Catalan regions. Autonomy did not
curtail the STA's terrorism however, for the ETA extremists
are demanding more than autonomy; instead they advocate com-
plete separation of the Basque region from Spain and its union
with the French Basque country as an independent, socialist state.
As mentioned previously, an integral part of the terrorist
and autonomy crisis in Spain is the reaction of the Spanish
military. Defusing the military threat to Spanish democracy
is a major task facing Spain's civilian regime and a central
theme of this thesis. Since Franco's death, the liberalization
of Spain's political climate has proven disturbing to many
members of the Armed Forces, especially those senior officers
who were indoctrinated under Francoism. The legalization of
political parties the Army had previously been trained to
persecute, the perceived erosion of Spanish unity that accom-
panied the government's program for regional autonomy and the
decline of law and order exemplified by the ETA provocation,
have contributed much to military discontent and to the danger
of a right-wing backlash against Spain's democratic institu-
tions. The history of modern Spain has made it clear that
internal political violence time and again has destroyed con-
stitutional government and produced a dictatorship to maintain
order. Whether the current regime of King Juan Carlos and
Premier Calvo Sotelo can effectively deal with this threat
23

will be a key factor in determining the viability of Spain's
democratic evolution.
The theme of this thesis is to examine the role of the
Spanish military as a factor that may inhibit democratic pro-
gress in Spain. Following a discussion of the United States'
interests in Spain (Chapter II) , an analysis of the Spanish
Armed Forces as an institution, both under the Franco regime
and in today's democratic Spain is presented (Chapter III).
The issues of autonomy and terrorism are then examined
(Chapter IV) with emphasis focused on the effect these issues
have on the military. This is followed by an analysis of the
threat of a military coup in Spain and the Government's efforts
to defuse this threat (Chapter V) . In conclusion, an assess-
ment of Spain's democratic viability is made (Chapter VI).
24

II. AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST IN SPAIN
A. DEFINING THE NATIONAL INTEREST
To place Spain's political transformation in its proper
perspective with respect to American foreign policy, it is
necessary to develop an understanding of the American nation-
al interest in Spain. As this chapter will demonstrate,
Spain's democratic evolution favors the American interest,
although distinct trade-offs among the various components of
this interest accompanied Spain's transition from Franco to
democracy. Prior to a detailed examination of the American
interest in Spain, however, it is necessary to define what is
meant by the term national interest and to develop an opera-
tional framework for the analysis of the American interest in
a given country.
The concept of the national interest has for decades been
a subject of review, study and debate among American political
and social scientists. It is used by political analysts to
describe, explain, and evaluate a nation's foreign policy
while at the same time the term national interest is used by
statesmen and other political actors to propose or renounce
policies and to justify or criticize a nation's actions in
the international arena. Although national interest is said
to describe the aspirations and goals of a nation-state, it
remains elusive and hard to pin down, for it is a vague
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concept, rooted in a nation's values and difficult to define
and measure empirically. Central to this problem is the
difficulty of specifying whose interests the national interest
should include and the lack of procedures for culminating the
single interests, once identified, into a national whole.
[28] Nonetheless, the national interest, however poorly
measured, according to J. Fankel, "is the filter through which
all international considerations have to pass before affect-
ing national actions." [29] Therefore, even though the
national interest may prove to be difficult to measure and
may appear at times to be vague and nebulous, it is the ulti-
mate standard by which one can evaluate a nation's foreign
policy.
As alluded to earlier, the national interest is a multi-
dimensional concept that can be put to a variety of uses.
To be more precise, the national interest can fall predomir
nately, though seldom exclusively, within one of the following
categories. [30]
On an aspirational level, national interest refers to the
vision of the good life, to some ideal set of goals which a
nation would like to realize if it were possible. "Life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness" is an example pertinent
to the American interest. Aspirational interests are generally
long term and rooted in a nation's history and culture. They
may, however, prove to be contradictory and may exceed a
nation's capability to achieve them.
26

On an operational level, national interests refer to the
sum of interests and policies actually pursued. They are
generally short-term and more in line with a nation's ability
to achieve them. These interests are influenced by changes
in the power of the state and by changes in the international
environment and are subject to the demands of the world order.
U.S. interests in NATO as an alliance to preserve Europe from
Soviet hegemony is an example of this type of interest.
On an explanatory or polemical level, the notion of
national interest is used to "explain, evaluate, rationalize
or criticize international behavior." [31] It is within
this context that the concept of national interest is perhaps
subject to the most abuse. Knowing how self-serving statements
of policy makers are apt to be, their use of the national
interest is often less to describe or prescribe than to prove
oneself right and one's opponents wrong.
Given its multidimensional utility, what are the objective
components of the American national interest as it applies
to the analysis and foirmulation of U.S. foreign policy? As
Donald Nuechterlein describes it, the realist school, (Morgan-
thau, Kennan, et al) , defined America's "objective" national
interest as the responsibility of a select. few experts "who
understood the world of international politics and were best
able to define the policies a nation should follow to enhance
its national interest vis-a-vis other states." [32] America's
Vietnam experience, however, was a dramatic example of a case
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in which American public opinion forced a redefinition of the
American national interest which had a profound effect on
American foreign policy throughout the 19 70 's. The point to
be made here is that the deterTnination of the national interest
is a product of America's political process and American poli-
tical and cultural values. Conflicting private interests,
public opinion, special interest groups, lobbyists, bureaucrats,
and the so-called "totally dispassionate view of the facts"
by policy makers, all play a role and should play a role in
the formulation of the national interest.
Another contention associated with the realist school, to
which the concept of national interest is closely tied, was
the idea that the national interest was synonymous with the
acquisition of national power, especially military power. But
why should the term national interest be so narrowly defined?
There are aspirations of a state other than the acquisition
of power. Just as pursuit of world socialism is a national
interest of the Soviet Union, pursuit of individual freedom
and democracy should be a valid goal of the United States.
Idealism, morality, and "realpolitik" are all constituents of
the national interest and need to be weighed and balanced in
the formulation of America's foreign policy.
As mentioned before, the national interest is the ultimate
standard by which one can evaluate foreign policy. Recognizing
the above limitations and considerations, it is convenient
to identify four basic interests of the United States that
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form the underpinnings of American foreign policy and which
in turn provide a reasonable framework by which the American
interest can be assessed.
Defense and security interests necessary for America's
self-preservation and protection from external threat.
Political or world order interests which maintain
an international political and economic system in which
America may feel secure and in which its citizens and
commerce may operate peacefully outside its borders.
Ideological interests which protect and further the
set values Americans believe to be universally good.
Economic interests which support America's economic
well-being and ultimately the collective welfare of its
citizens. [38]
These interests are not mutually exclusive and policy
makers must accept trade-offs among them. Furthermore, the
order in which these interests are listed does not necessarily
reflect any priority of one over another. Priorities, like
perceptions of the national interest change, but as a caveat,
it may be argued as Nuechterlein does, that "unless a nation-
state can defend its territory and citizens either through
a strong defense or in alliance with others or both, none of
the other three interests are likely to matter much." [34]
Given this framework, one can review and analyze the
American interest in Spain both under the Franco regime, and
today, under its democratic banner. It should be remembered
however, that the national interest is but a perception and
perceptions, no matter if they are those of the President,
the Cabinet, the Congress, or the general public, are
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influenced by tiie domestic and international environments
and are subject to change. A policy at the time of formulation
may not be based on a concrete appraisal of the national
interest but may instead be a composite of what various in-
dividuals or groups perceive the interest to be. History,
therefore, is the ultimate judge of whether a policy did in
fact support a nation's interest, for it is from the histor-
ical perspective that form and definition are given to the
national interest and from which an accurate evaluation of
a nation's foreign policy are made.
B. AiMERICA AND FRANCO
United States foreign policy toward Spain following World
War II represents one of the most striking reversals of rela-
tions between states in modern history. After Franco's Civil
War victory in 19 39, U.S. relations with Spain virtually ended.
Yet by 19 53, with the signing of the Madrid Pact, the lone
surviving signer of the 19 39 Anti-Comintern Pact had become
aligned with the free-world camp without experiencing the
total defeat, destruction and revolution that had purged
Germany, Italy and Japan of their fascist and militarist
regimes. [35]_
This reversal was the product of Franco's willingness to
align Spain with the United States which emerged from World
War II as the world's strongest political and economic power
and the growing perception in the United States that the
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Soviet Union represented the greatest threat to the American
national interest.
From the end of World War II to 19 48, the prospect of
closer ties with Spain had little support in the United States.
Immediately following the war, Franco's Spain underwent almost
complete ostracism for two years. Spain was excluded from the
newly formed United Nations and the great powers recalled their
chiefs of missions from Madrid. In addition, the United
States, Britain and France joined in a Tripartite Declaration,
(March 4, 19 46) , aimed at encouraging liberalization in Spain
and purging it of its Nazi-fascist elements. The declaration
stated that the Spanish people "could not look forward to full
and cordial association with them as long as Franco remained
in control of Spain." [37]
The antagonism toward Spain was the strongest in Western
Europe. In liberated France, De Gaulle's interim government,
which closed the Pyrennes border with Spain, had taken a strong
anti-Franco line from the start. Britain's new labour gov-
ernment gave ostracism strong support and the anti-Franco line
was followed by the smaller European nations as well. [38]
This period, as Benjamin Welles suggests, was "Franco's
darkest moment," [39] Soviet aggressiveness, however, soon
began to drive a wedge between the wartime allies. The
Soviet demands on Iran in 19 46, the threats to Greece and
Turkey in 1947-48, the strengthening of the Soviet stronghold
over Eastern Europe, the communist victory in China and the
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Berlin blockade of 19 49 brought about an emerging consensus
in the United States that the Soviet Union was the most serious
threat to the democratic institutions of the free world.
3y the end of 19 47, the United States was in the thick
of the Cold War. Earlier in the year, the Truman Doctrine
had been proclaimed, and by 19 49, an anti-Soviet alliance,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, had been formed. In
essence, the premises of U.S. foreign policy had been altered
as the content of the American national interest was redefined
to deal with the Soviet threat. The Truman Doctrine symbolized
the United States' role as a superpower and the policy of
containment, as articulated by George Kennan in his famous
"Mr. X" article began to dictate American foreign policy
objectives. [40]
Given Spain's geographic position and Franco's consistent
anti-communist line, interest in the normalization of rela-
tions with the Franco regime began to grow in the United
States. As early as October 19 47, George Kennan, then Chief
of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, recom-
mended in a top secret memorandum that "in the national
interest, the time has come for a modification of our policy
toward Spain with a view toward early normalization of United
States - Spanish relations both political and economic." [41]
President Truman, however, remained opposed to the fascist
nature of the Franco regime and effectively held in check the
so called "Spanish lobby" that favored a new policy toward
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Spain. Truman's opposition was strengthened, as Arthur
Whi taker suggests, "by the example of Western European powers
rejecting Franco's bid for association with them in a western
alliance against the Soviet menace." [42]
The outbreak of the Korean War in June 19 50, however,
put a new face on the Spanish question in the United States.
With the threat of general war, strategy took an upper hand
over ideology; military considerations took priority over
political considerations in shaping U.S. foreign policy toward
Spain. In short, the ideological component of the American
national interest took a back seat to the defensive necessity
of halting Soviet aggression.
The demonstration of Stalin's aggressive ambitions in
Korea set off a quest for overseas bases by the United States.
The negotiations with Spain that began in July 19 51 were a
part of this quest. Spain was viewed by U.S. policy makers
as a potential ally that could support American defense and
security interests. Spain's geographical position could be
utilized to control Western access to the Mediterranean as
well as providing a fall back area in the event of a Soviet
lunge into Western Europe. The Pyrenees posed a formidable
barrier and were considered one of the strongest natural de-
fense lines in Europe behind which a secure storage of bulk
military cargos could be stockpiled for the defense of Europe.
[43] Furthermore, the establishment of strategic air bases
in Spain as a supplement to those being established in North
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Africa would permit B-47 bomber missions to be conducted
against the Soviet Union without the necessity for in-flight
refueling. In sum, the acquisition of bases would add another
link to the global security network that the United States
was building to contain the Soviet Union.
The signing of the Madrid Pact between the United States
and Spain in September 19 53 marked the end of Spain's isola-
tion and formed the nucleus of U.S. - Spanish relations
throughout the Franco era. In essence, the Madrid Pact con-
sisted of three separate but interdependent executive agree-
ments on defense, economic aid and mutual defense assistance
which did not require approval by the U.S. Senate. [44]
In short, what the United States received was the right
to develop, use, and maintain military bases in Spain in re-
turn for economic and military assistance. The 19 6 3 Agreement
to extend the Pact and the 19 70 "Agreement of Friendship and
Cooperation" which succeeded it, did not alter significantly
the extent of U.S. base privileges in Spain but did increase
the financial costs for those privileges. From 19 53 to 19 75
the cost to the United States of the Spanish bases totaled
seven billion dollars. This figure included $1,762.8 million
in economic aid, $2,230.1 million in military aid, and $3
billion to build and operate the bases. [45]
Given the costs, how well were American interests served
by U.S. foreign policy toward Spain during the Franco regime?
Some, such as Ron Hadian, argue that the U.S. overextended
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itself in Spain on the premise that Spanish bases were neces-
sary to enhance the credibility of the American nuclear
deterrent prior to the advent of the intercontinental ballistic
missile and to meet VJestern Europe's defense needs. As a
result, "Franco was successful in his pursuit of substantial
economic and military aid from the United States, aid which
was crucial to the maintenance of his regime," [46] Further-
more, Franco's relationship with the United States gained for
him the prestige and acceptability for his regime that was
denied him by the democracies of Western Europe. An addition-
al cost of the Pact, therefore, was the impact it had on the
U.S. image. By providing economic and military assistance
to the authoritarian Franco regime, "American policy makers
lent credibility to charges of a right-wing bias in American
foreign policy." [47]
The initial premise of U.S. foreign policy toward Franco
Spain was the promotion of American defense and security
interests by containing the Soviet threat. In this respect,
U.S. bases in Spain served to increase the credibility of
America's nuclear deterrent. The deployment of B-47 squadrons
to Spain was a significant part of the Strategic Air Command's
nuclear strike force throughout the 1950 's and 1960 's. With
the development of the long range bomber and the inter-
continental ballistic missile however, the utility of these bases
diminished and the forward deployment of the B-47 was
terminated. Indeed the b- 4 7s were themselves phased out.
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American strategic deterrence was still served, to a less-
er extent, by the naval base in Rota which serviced American
ballistic submarines until 1979. In addition, this base con-
tributed to the American naval presence in the Mediterranean
and with the deployment of maritime patrol squadrons there,
enhanced American anti-submarine warfare coverage of the
western Mediterranean and the approaches to the Straits of
Gibraltar.
With regard to American political and world order interests,
U.S. foreign policy objectives in Spain were geared to the
integration of Spain into the Western alliance system. Given
Spain's strong proclivity for neutrality, an increased accep-
tance by the Spanish people of the importance of collective
security and international cooperation would further this
objective. The thrust of U.S. policy in this regard was to
get Spain admitted to NATO. Military aid to Spain was an
attempt to modernize Spanish Armed Forces and bring them up
to a NATO level of competence. As a consequence of Europe's
refusal to admit Spain to the alliance as long as Franco was
in power, however, the United States never pushed this issue
very hard before the NATO's North Atlantic Council. With more
pressing problems demanding resolution and alliance cohesion,
the Spanish issue was of secondary importance.
The impact on American economic interests during this
period was minimal. Franco opened Spanish markets to foreign
investment, but the costs of U.S. base privileges in terms of
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economic aid and the balance of payments outflow required to
support the stationing of American military personnel and
their dependents in Spain outweighed any gains achieved in
the private sector. [48] It can be argued, however, that
U.S. economic aid which helped stabilize and bolster the
Spanish economy, provided the impetus for modernizing Spanish
industry, facilitating Spain's potential participation in the
European Common Market and thus furthering the integration of
Spain into the western order. [49] Once again, though, as
long as Franco remained in power and his authoritarian regime
continued, liberal West European governments remained opposed
to any such overtures on behalf of Spain.
U.S. foreign policy support of American ideological inter-
ests, namely the promotion of individual freedoms and democrat-
ic government, during this period was minimal. The majority
of the criticism of American relations with Spain centered
upon American support for an authoritarian and undemocratic
regime. Critics pointed out that U.S. support for Franco
deterred affective democratic political opposition within
Spain and that American foreign policy was shaped by defense
interests as defined by the Pentagon. [50] It can also be
said however, that given the threat communism appeared to
present to the American conception of the world political order,
support of Franco's anti-communist orientation was in the
American interest. In other words, support of a totalitarin-
ism of the right was respectable as a bulwark against a more
menancing totalitarinism of the left.
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In suiTunation, U.S. foreign policy toward Spain during the
Franco era involved several trade-offs with respect to the
American national interest. American defense and security
interests were supported, although the degree of support
varied with changes in weapons technology and the nature of
the threat, at the expense of American ideological and econom-
ic interests. Promotion of political and world order interests
met with some success by nurturing Franco's pro-western and
anti-communist orientation, however, the conflict this policy
created with Western and American ideological interests
limited the extent of its success.
C. DEMOCRATIC SPAIN AND THE AMERICAN INTEREST
With the death of Franco in 19 75, a new era in Spain's
political evolution began. Spain's move toward democracy,
coupled with a change in America's perception of its role in
the international system caused a re-evaluation of the Ameri-
can national interest and American policy toward Spain.
Today's international system is more complex than the
system that confronted policy makers in 19 50 when modern U.S.-
Spanish relations were first being crystallized. The strict
bipolar system has given way to a multipolar world in which
the dichotomy between East and West has become fuzzy and
blurred. The emergence of the Third World, regional economic
powers such as Japan, West Germany, and Brazil, an integrated
Western Europe, a Communist China independent of Russian
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hegemony, economic cartels such as OPEC and regional rival-
ries have complicated the international political picture.
The world community, as described by the U.S. State
Department, has become interedependent and "the products of
man's technical genius - weapons of incalculable power, a
global economic system, instantaneous communication, a tech-
nology that consumes finite resources at an ever expanding
rate - have, by compressing this planet, multiplied the con-
sequences of competition." [51] In this world, the United
States can no longer overwhelm its problems by superior mil-
itary force or brute economic strength, for its predominance
in physical resources and political power has diminished. In
pursuing its national interest, America must take into account
the global interest. National security requires global se-
curity national prosperity requires an expanding global
economy and interdependence requires a higher level of mutual
comprehension. The old extremes of world policeman and
isolation are no longer feasible. To help shape a world of
stability, justice, and international cooperation, therefore,
is to further the American national interest. [52] This
understanding of the present international system and the
position of the United States in it, is prerequisite to an
understanding of the current American interest in Spain.
The foundation of the present American relationship with
Spain is the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain
that was entered in force on September 21, 19 76 for a period
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of five years if both governments agree. [53] It replaced
the series of executive agreements which have determined U.S.-
Spanish relations since 19 53 and has provided an institutional
framework to facilitate increased cooperation on defense issues,
economic questions, education and cultural affairs, and scien-
tific and technological matters between the two countries.
The main purpose of the Treaty for the United States was to
assure the continued availability to the United States of three
air bases and one naval base in Spain. To this end, various
forms of military assistance, sales and other benefits total-
ing $1.2 billion are provided over a five year period. In
addition, the Treaty created a basis for Spain's future rela-
tions with its West European neighbors. It provides for
cooperation in defense with the intent of assisting Spain in
developing a role which will contribute actively to the defense
of the North Atlantic area and to provide transitional insti-
tutions to prepare the way for an appropriate Spanish role
in NATO. To this end, a combined Planning and Coordination
Staff was established to provide contingency plans for Spain
in case of a general attack on the West. The United States,
in turn, was granted the right to use and maintain the mili-
tary facilities it had heretofore enjoyed but with some
important exceptions. The number of KC-135 tankers in Spain
was to be reduced to a maximum of five and the nuclear sub-
marines at the Rota naval base were to be withdrawn by July
1, 1979. In addition, the United States agreed not to store
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nuclear weapons or their components on Spanish soil. It is
important to note that the defense provisions of the Treaty
did not constitute a security guarantee on the part of the
United States to defend Spain. They did, however, constitute
a recognition of Spain's importance as a part of the western
bloc.
The criticism of the Treaty that was expressed during the
Senate ratification hearings reflected a shift in emphasis
from American security interests in Spain to American political
and ideological interests. Although the Treaty had been nego-
tiated for the most part while Franco was still alive, when
it was initialed in Madrid on January 24, 19 76, movement
toward democracy in Spain seemed possible. The main consider-
ation for the Congress in acting on the Treaty was whether or
not the relationship embodied in the Treaty would encourage
development of Spain into a democracy allied with the United
States and Western Europe. The utility of the bases them-
selves seemed to be barely an issue for most Senators. [54]
Given this foundation to America's present relationship
with Spain, the following is a summary of the current American
interest in that country.
1. Defense and Security Interests
The contribution of the American military presence in
Spain to America's strategic nuclear deterrent is minimal.
As discussed previously, American SAC forces in Spain were
withdrawn with the advent of the ICBM. Furthermore, in
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accordance with the provisions of the 1976 Treaty, American
nuclear submarine have been withdrawn from Rota, leaving only
Holy Loch, Scotland, available to service America's SSBNs in
the Atlantic theater. At the time of the agreement, it was
expected that deployment of the new Trident class submarine
would eliminate the necessity for basing missile carrying
submarines in Spain. With delays in the Trident deployment
however, the loss of Rota's nuclear support capability has
overloaded facilities at Holy Loch. [55]
Strategic nuclear considerations aside, Spain still
has considerable military value for the defense of Europe and
the North Atlantic and Mediterranean areas. Spain's geographic
position provides for a capability to control the naval and
commercial shipping lanes in the western Mediterranean, the
Straits of Gibraltar, and the eastern Atlantic. Spain lies
astride a major air route between North American on the one
hand and NATO's southern flank and the Middle East on the
other. In addition, the Pyrenees remain a potential last line
of continental defense.
The naval base at Rota provides logistic support for
the U.S. Sixth Fleet and supports the U.S. Navy's airborne
anti-submarine warfare and ocean surveillance operations.
Torre jo'^n air base located just east of Madrid serves as the
headquarters of a tactical fighter wing whose aircraft at
forward operating bases outside Spain have a nuclear strike
mission in the event of war in Europe. Torrejc^n also serves
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as a major staging, reinforcement and logistic airlift base
for U.S. forces in Europe, while Zaragoza air base in north-
east Spain is used as a tactical fighter trainihg facility
and is situated near the Bardenas Reales firing range where
gunnery and bombing practice for units in the U.S. Air Force
Europe (USAFS) and the U.S. Navy takes place. [56]
It is generally assumed that in the event of a
European war, Spanish base facilities would be made available
but it is important to remember that activities at the bases
are subject to Spanish approval. [57] Spanish membership
in NATO would, at least in the case of a European war, make
access to these military facilities more secure. As mentioned
previously, American policy makers have long considered the
potential advantages of Spanish membership in NATO to outweigh
the fact that Spain was ruled by an authoritarian regime.
With the signing of the 1976 Treaty, the United States made
specific provisions for paving the way for Spain's eventual
participation in the Western Alliance.
One of the most important benefits to the Alliance,
aside from the contribution of the Spanish Armed Forces,
would be the inclusion of Spanish territory in the NATO area.
According to a Library of Congress Report, "NATO experts gen-
erally believe that some of the problems resulting from
France's non-participation in NATO's integrated command would
be ameliorated. NATO would regain some territorial depth of
defense and would enjoy more flexible and dependable lines of
logistics and communications. [58]
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2. Political and World Order Interests
Spanish participation in NATO is part of the larger
question of Spanish integration into the Western Community.
With Franco's death and the emergence of democracy in Spain,
interest in Spain's participation in the councils of Europe
increased among Americans, West Europeans and Spaniards alike,
"Joining Europe" has been one of the principal ob-
jectives of King Juan Carlos I. [59] To most Spaniards,
however, joining Europe is considered a two-sided coin.
Spanish participation in the European Common Market has been
eagerly supported by all of Spain's political parties and is
as much politically as economically motivated. On the other
side of the coin, Spain's entry into NATO, although endorsed
by the United States and other NATO members, has been the
subject of intense political debate within Spain. King Juan
Carlos and the minority government have gone on record in
favor of joining NATO. Spain's Socialist Worker Party (PSOE)
and the Communist Party (PCE) are opposed. This issue and
its implications for the Spanish Armed Forces are discussed
in Chapter V of this thesis.
The political forces in Spain are aware of the out-
come desired by the United States, but, officially at least,
the American government has held a low political profile on
the issue in the belief that overt pressure would likely be
counterproductive. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has
taken an intense interest in pressuring Spain not to join the
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NATO alliance. During his first visit to Madrid, for example,
Russian Foreign Minister Gromyko in November 19 79 made it
abundently clear that Spain's entry into NATO would be con-
sidered by the Kremlin to be an unfriendly act upsetting to
the "military balance" in Europe. [60]
3
.
Ideological Interests
The democratic evolution in Spain signified an impor-
tant milestone in the history of Western Europe. With the end
of the Colonels' rule in Greece and the dissolution of the
Portuguese and Spanish dictatorships, every Western European
country is presently in democratic hands for the first time
since General Miguel Primo de Rivera's "pronunciamiento" in
Spain in 1923.
American support for Spanish democracy, though pro-
fessed, has been rather low key. Stanley Payne, testifying
before the House Committee on International Relations, when
questioned on whether the United States has pursued a policy
of encouraging Spanish democracy replied, "Oh yes, very def-
initely so. We talked about this in some detail at the State
Department in 19 75 and certainly it has been the intention of
the American Embassy in Spain to encourage democraticization
but not to become involved in any kind of overt way. We let
them know we encourage this, that we support it, but that we
don't want to intervene or take any overt policy toward the
Spanish political process." [61]
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This policy is too low key for some Spanish tastes,
however. Secretary Haig's casual remark to a group of
journalists in Washington during the abortive February 23,
1981 coup in Spain, saying that it was an internal Spanish
affair, caused a stir in political circles in Madrid and set
off speculation in the Spanish press that the Reagan Adminis-
tration was indifferent to the fate of the young Spanish
democracy. The slip obliged Secretary Haig to make a special
trip to Spain in April to emphasize America's support for
Spain's democratic transition. [62]
A democratic Spain, while in American ideological
interests, might pose a dilemma for the other components of
the American interest. The dilemma is created by the fact
that Western democracy, by its very nature, implies the
possibility for change, changes in government, political
parties and therefore in the character and policies of the
regime. A democratic system, by giving full play to political
forces can lead to instability which is not tolerated in an
authoritarian system. According to a Library of Congress
report, "It is at least theoretically possible that a demo-
cratic system in Spain will raise questions about U.S.
investments and or base rights that might not have been raised
or at least not given prominence in the Franco era." [63]
4. Economic Interests
In contrast to the Franco era, American economic
interests in Spain today are more than a one-way dispersal
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of economic aid. Granted, over the five year period of the
present treaty, $1.2 billion will have been spent in aid to
Spain, but in 19 77 alone, Spain imported approximately $2.1
billion in American goods. [64]
The American Embassy in Madrid judges Spain to be one
of the principal markets for American exports inspite of the
depressed state of the Spanish economy. Spanish imports from
the United States grew by more than twenty five percent between
1978 and 1979 from $2.5 billion to $3.2 billion and by forty-
two percent from 1979 to 1980 to a total of $4.5 billion.
[65]
American investment in Spain has also increased over
the past few years. General Motors is in the process of
locating in Spain its largest new investment ($2.0 billion)
in its corporate history and thus will join Ford Motor Company
as a Spanish manufacturer of automobiles for export. U.S.
business investments in Spain, valued at some $2.5 billion,
are substantially larger than those of any other nation. [66]
Attractive factors for U.S. investment include, competitive
labor costs, an important domestic market, future integration
into European Community (American multinationals are setting
up plants in Spain in the hope of using that country as a
platform for tariff free exports into the much larger EC
market) and a welcome mat for foreign investors which includes
a number of generous tax and investment incentives. [67]
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Future growth of American exports and investment in
Spain, however, will depend heavily on whether the Spanish
economy can sustain real growth while combating serious in-
flation, high unemployment and persistent balance of payments
deficits. The ability of Spain to deal with its economic
problems will in turn be affected by whatever political tur-
moil and uncertainties accompany its continued democratic
evolution.
As I have attempted to illustrate, American interests
in Spain are complex and interdependent and have required
trade-offs among the several components of the national
interest. There has been a shift in the relative weights of
these components in determining American foreign policy toward
Spain. The almost complete domination of security and de-
fense interests in defining our foreign policy objectives
toward Franco Spain has given way to a more balanced appraisal
of the American interest in Spain. The relative importance
of economic, ideological and political interests has increased,
while American security interests, although still perhaps
America's largest stake in Spain, have diminished.
America's most immediate foreign policy objective in
Spain is the renegotiation of the 19 76 Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation which "expired" in September 19 81. Spain
seems determined to win two concessions during the negotia-
tions; equal treatment with America's other allies, which has
Dolitical and economic significance as well as military, and
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access to modern weapons and new technology to continue the
modernization of Spain's Armed Forces. [58] Specific issues
Spain is Likely to raise include increased Spanish sovereignty
and control over U.S. base facilities in Spain, pressure on
the United States for a defense commitment to Spain, a commit-
ment to seek a trade balance between the two countries and a
more equitable credit arrangement which, according to Spanish
officials, has been disappointing in the past. [69]
The United States continues to support Spain's entry
into NATO, recognizing, however, that the decision rests with
the Spanish people. The present government of Calvo Sotelo
has accelerated Spain's application for membership, and on
December 10, 1931, Spain received a formal invitation to join
from NATO. With Spain's acceptance of the invitation likely,
it can be expected that the United States will take the lead
in integrating the Spanish Armed Forces into the NATO command
structure. [70]
Spanish integration into the West is very much an
American interest and will continue to be encouraged by U.S.
policymakers. It is apparent that as Spanish democracy de-
veloped so has Spain's own perception of its role in the
world and its willingness to take its place among the West's
other democracies. The success of Spain's integration is
dependent upon the continued success of its democratic evolu-
tion. The resolution by the Spanish people of their economic,
terrorist, and political problems is crucial to continued
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democratic progress in Spain. The success or failure of
their efforts will in turn influence any future appraisal of
the American national interest in Spain.
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III. THE SPANISH ARMED FORCES
As mentioned previously, the reaction of the Spanish
military to Spain's democratic transition and the potential
threat the military poses to Spain's democratic viability
are the central themes of this thesis. This chapter focuses
upon the Spanish Armed Forces as an institution within
Spanish society. Following a brief summary of Spain's present
defense organization, the role of the military under the Franco
regime is discussed. This, in turn, is followed by an analysis
of the military in democratic Spain with particular attention
paid to the reaction of the armed services to Spain's polit-
ical transformation following Franco's death, their response
to democratic change and liberalization, and the government's
early efforts to incorporate the military into the democrati-
zation process.
A. SPAIN'S DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
The supreme command of the Spanish Armed Forces, under
Article 6 2 of the new Spanish Constitution, rests with the
Head of State, King Juan Carlos I. To assist the King, the
office of Deputy Prime Minister for Defense Affairs was
created in 1977. In contrast to the Franco era, during which
the Array, Navy, and Air Force were organized under separate
and independent ministries, the present defense organization,
established by decree on July 4, 1977, combined all three
services under a single Minister of Defense. [71]
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The mission of the Armed Services, established in Article
8 of the Constitution, is to "guarantee Spain's sovereignty
and independence, maintain its territorial integrity, and
ensure that the Constitution is not violated." Spains domes-
tic security forces, the Guardia Civil (Civil Guard) and the
newly reformed National Police (formerly the Armed Police)
are responsible to the government for the protection of the
rights of the individual and for ensuring internal security.
[72]
Formerly considered part of the Armed Services, the
Guardia Civil and the National Police are no longer indenti-
fied with the Ministry of Defense. As a result of a bill
passed by the Cortes in 1980, these groups were reorganized
under the Minister of the Interior. This change was meant to
break-up the powerful armed forces in an attempt to ensure
that the two sections would operate on different planes, one
dealing with external defense, the other with internal security,
The same bill further stated that neither recruits nor offi-
cers of the Guardia Civil or National Police would, in the
future, be drawn from the Army as was previous policy. The
leadership of both organizations, however, was left untouched,
thus leaving an Army general in command. [73]
Of Spain's estimated 342,000 men in the armed forces, by
far the largest percentage are in the Army with 255,000
(190,000 concripts) followed by the Navy with 49,000 (includ-
ing 12,500 Marines and 40,000 conscripts), and the Air Force
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with 38,000. [74] The Spanish Army is made up of three major
groups, a Rapid Intervention Group, trained and equipped for
"conventional and limited nuclear war," a Territorial Defense
Force, organized to reinforce the rapid intervention forces
and specially trained to defend the country in both conven-
tional and guerrilla warfare, and a General Reserve whose
purpose is to reinforce the larger units above. The Spanish
mainland is divided into nine military regions with a brigade
of the territorial defense force acting as garrison for each.
The highest authority in the Army chain of command is the Army
Chief of Staff who is politically under the authority of the
Minister of Defense. [75]
Command of the Navy is vested in the Naval Chief of Staff.
Reporting directly to him are the commanders of four maritime
zones, the Bay of Biscay, Straits of Gibraltar, Mediterranean,
and Canary Islands, and the Commander of the Fleet. The fleet
is divided into three commands, an Escort Command, an Amphibious
Command, and an Aviation Command. The Marine Corps is a
special force within the Navy and is under the operational
command of the Commander of the Fleet. [76]
The Spanish Air Force is commanded by the Air Force Chief
of Staff. Four operational commands exist. They are the Air
Defense Command, with headquarters in Madrid, consisting of
five interceptor squadrons equipped with American F-4C Phantom
and French Mirage III and Mirage F-1 aircraft; a Tactical
Command, headquartered in Seville, is composed of a
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fighter-bomber wing and a maritime patrol wing which are
responsible for providing air support to the surface forces;
a Transport Command, which supports all three branches of the
armed forces and includes catastrophe relief, evacuation and
rescue among its missions; and the Canaries Command, which
was created to carry out the tasks of the other three Air
Force commands in the Canary Islands zone. [77]
Spain's para-military forces number 6 4,000 in the Guardia
Civil and 40,000 in the National Police. [78] The Guardia
Civil is responsible for policing all rural areas, control of
ports and frontiers, and for highway traffic. It is commanded
by a lieutenant general of the Army. The militarized National
Police, on the other hand, is responsible for policing all
population centers of over 30,000 inhabitants. [79]
B. THE MILITARY UNDER FRANCO
During the Franco era, the armed forces, and in particular
the Army, viewed themselves as the arbiters of politics and
as the guarantors of stability in Spain. The Fundamental
Laws of the State, a series of seven laws enacted over a
thirty year period which taken together made up the Spanish
Constitution of the Franco regime, institutionalized the role
of the armed forces.* Under Article 3 2 of the Organic Law
*
The seven laws were The Principles of the National Move-
ment (15 May 19 58) , the Charter of the Spanish People (17
July 1945, modified 10 January 1967), the Labor Charter
(9 March 1938, modified 10 January 1967), the Organic Law of
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of the State, "the Armed Forces of the Nation, consisting of
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Police, guarantee
the unity and independence of the country, the integrity of
her territory, the national security, and the defense of the
institutional system." [81]
The armed forces were given a place, either by law or in
practice, on all the major bodies of the Franco regime. These
included the Council of the Realm - a body created to assist
Franco as Head of State in all matters pertaining to his
office - in which the military was represented by the longest
serving Captain General or Lieutenant General in the Armed
Services and by the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffs;
the Council of Ministers (Cabinet) which included the Ministers
of the Army, Navy and Air Force, men who were identified
intimately and exclusively with the military: and the Cortes -
Franco's unicameral legislature - among whose members were
included the Cabinet and the President of the Supreme Court
of Military Justice. [82]
In any account of power groups in Franco Spain, the Armed
Forces must come first. Historically, decisive power in
Spain lies not with political bargaining or moral authority,
but with physical force, a commodity of which the Armed Forces
the State (10 January 1967), the Law of the Cortes (17 July
19 42, modified 9 March 19 46 and 10 January 196 7) , the Law on
the Succession to the Head of State (7 July 1947, modified
10 January 19 67) and the Law on the Referendum (22 October
1945). [80]
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enjoyed a near monopoly. For over a century preceeding
Franco's reign, the military had been persistently involved
in the political affairs of the Spanish state. Through coups,
mutinies or "pronunciamientos , " the military was either the
instigator of or the major participant in most of the govern-
mental changes between 1814 and the Civil War of the 1930 's.
The loss of external missions that accompanied the dissolution
of the Spanish Empire further reeinforced the military's grow-
ing internal role in Spanish society. The Riff war of the
early twentieth century (which was the last major involvement
by the Spanish armed forces in an overseas mission) was
ineptly managed by successive civilian governments and fueled
the Spanish officer corps' inherent distrust of civilian
politicians and governments.
As Arthur P. Whitaker wrote, "while all governments may
rest on force in the last instance, Franco rested on it from
first to last." [83] Created by the military in the first
place, the Franco regime relied upon the Army above all else
in preserving its long life. It was the Army that brought
Franco to power during the Civil War and it was the Army that
kept him there.
Unlike other Chiefs of State who are their nation's
Commanders in Chief but who usually delegate the running of
the military to their subordinates. Franco always played a
personal role in the Armed Forces. Aware of the impact the
Spanish military had on domestic politics in the 19th and
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early 20th centuries. Franco managed to keep the Armed Forces
out of politics, making it, in effect, one of the mainstays
of his regime. Key military appointments went to those tho
served with Franco during the Civil War and who remained loyal
to him and the War's "crusading spirit" that saved Spain from
the evils of republicanism, liberalism, and communism. Like
most professional soldiers, Franco's Generals held order and
discipline in great esteem, but uppermost in their proprieties
were nationalism, the preservation of the integrity of the
Spanish state, and the maintenance of the political status
quo. [84] Officers who joined the Ainny after the Civil War
were thoroughly indoctrinated in Francoism, with many eventu-
ally owing their careers to Franco. As a result, a senior
officer corps developed that tended to be ignorant of the
outside world - a condition reinforced by Spain's ostracism
following World War II - and deeply contemptuous of civilians
and liberal societies.
Under Franco the Army was deployed more like a police
force than as a defender against external aggression. Army
officers loyal to Franco were placed in charge of the Civil
Guard and Armed Police, whose mission appeared more in line
with the repression of dissent than of crime. These forces
were particularly repressive in those regions, such as the
Basque Provinces and Catalonia, which opposed Franco most
strongly during the Civil War.
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The Spanish Army under Franco suffered from too many
generals and antiquated equipment, leaving it far behind the
modern mobile armies of other European nations. Yet, through-
out this era, the Army's monopoly of substantial armed strength
and, as John Coverdale observed, "the almost universal con-
viction that it would use force if necessary," made it a crit-
ical factor in delineating the parameters within which political
groups could maneuver. "No responsible government official
or opposition figure was likely to take a step or make a
proposal which seemed destined to provoke an Army intervention."
[85] Thus, while the Army never directly intervened in
Spanish politics under Franco, the acknowledgement of the
threat it posed inhibited reform and helped Franco maintain
the political status quo in Spain.
C. THE MILITARY AND DEMOCRATIC SPAIN
The Spanish transition to democracy as described pre-
viously, was engineered primarily by two men. King Juan Carlos
I and his Premier, Aldolfo Suarez. From the time of Franco's
death to the signing into law of the new Constitution in
December 1978, this political transformation was made from
within the existing political order inherited from the Franco
regime. Because there was no clear-cut break with the past,
those senior generals and admirals whose views and careers
had been shaped under and by the Franco regime, remained in
command of Spain's military forces. [86]
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Spain, however, had outgrown the Franco regime and was
anxious to take its rightful place among the free and demo-
cratic nations of Europe. By the mid-19 70 's, broad currents
of mass and elite opinion favored democracy for Spain. Even
within the armed services, elements of unrest had begun to
appear. In July 19 75, nine Spanish officers, members of a
leftist "Spanish Military Union," were arrested and tried for
sedition. [87] This is not to suggest that there existed in
the Spanish Army anything even remotely comparable to the
left-wing groups that dominated the Portuguese army and re-
belled in 19 74. Spanish officers, however, were nonetheless
discontented. Pay below flag rank was quite low and promotion
opportunities, limited by an advancement system that encouraged
seniority, resulted in a command structure top heavy with
aged generals and admirals. [88]
Among young Array officers, the fact that the Army was
without an effective modern defense mission also proved dis-
concerting. While the Navy and Air Force had been success-
fully modernized and through joint exercises with U.S. and
other European forces had achieved a sense of professionalism
comparable with their European counterparts, the Army was
poorly equipped, poorly trained, and limited primarily to
garrison duty throughout Spain. As a result, the Spanish
Army lagged behind the armies of Western Europe and developed
an inward- looking mentality, which was especially prevalent
among its senior officers. [39]
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The Spanish senior officer corps remained a solidly en-
trenched institution which over the years had become effec-
tively isolated from the fabric of Spanish society. Junior
military officers, however, were much more integrated into
the social whole. Many were forced by their low pay to take
second jobs and function as part of Spain's wider and changing
society. In addition, their daily contact with each year's
class of conscripts, in a country with universal military
service, further enhanced their social and philosophical
separation from their superiors.
By and large, the Spanish Armed Forces acquiesced to the
transition to democracy but not without adverse reaction from
the more conservative members of the military elite. A key
figure in gaining the military's acceptance of democratic
reform was King Juan Carlos I. Juan Carlos was educated in
the academies of Spain's three services and many of his
closest friends were young military officers with whom he had
gone to school. [90] By cultivating the officer corps' alle-
giance to the Crown and by indicating early on his support for
the restoration of democracy, Juan Carlos was able to obtain
in September 19 76 the reluctant support of the nation's mili-
tary leaders for the governments reform program.
This support was not without challenge, however, with
resistance to the King's and Prime Minister Suarez's program
coming from conservative General Fernando de Santiago, the
First Vice Premier for Defense and the military's top
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representative in the Cabinet. According to David Jordan,
"When Santiago continued to drag his feet by invoking the
name of Franco and by writing a letter to other generals
saying that the reforms threatened chaos and the return of
the communists and anarchists defeated by Franco in the Civil
War", he was fired. [91] He was replaced by General Manuel
Guiterrez Mellado, a close supporter of Juan Carlos and a
liberal among high-ranking Spanish officers. [82]
Santiago's forced resignation caused some unrest among
other military leaders, but it failed to swing them over to
opposition to the King and the government. When Lieutenant
General Carlos Iniesta, a former head of the Guardia Civil
openly supported Santiago, he too was dismissed. As John
Coverdale observed, the King's "personal popularity among the
military and his prestige as the incarnation of the legitimate
authority of the state proved to be more influential than the
generals' aversion to democratic reform." By demonstrating
its strength in the face of conservative military opinion, the
King's government won for itself freedom to maneuver in the
future. [9 3]
The King and his Prime Minister continued their efforts to
gain unchallenged control of the armed forces and the police.
Lieutenant General Guiterrez Mellado, Santiago's replacement,
was given a free hand to make the armed forces more compatible
with those of NATO, an indication of the Monarchy's hope to
integrate Spain into Western Europe and to define a new modern
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defense mission which would enable it to take the Army out of
politics and the internal affairs of the state. In addition,
other ultra-conservative military leaders were replaced by
men of more moderate or liberal credentials. Positions that
were affected included the commands of various military
regions, the Commander of the Guardia Civil and the Army Chief
of Staff. [94]
These efforts to neutralize the armed forces became criti-
cal when the government decided to legalize the Communist Party
of Spain (PCE) in April 1977. Prime Minister Suarez had little
choice in this matter for he wanted the upcoming June parlia-
mentary elections to appear democratic to the outside world.
The move was also necessary to ensure the PSOE's participation
in the election and to avoid leftist rioting. [9 5]
The reaction to the legalization of the PCE was intense,
especially in the Ajnny. The Minister of the Navy, an admiral,
resigned over the issue and the Supreme Council of the Army
proclaimed its repulsion over the legalization. In a position
paper presented to the King and the Prime Minister and leaked
to the press, the Council said, "The legalization of the
Communist Party produced a general repulsion in all units of
the Army. Nevertheless, in view of the national interests of
a higher order, the accomplished fact is accepted in a dis-
ciplined way. The Council deems it necessary to inform the
Government that the Anny, unanimously united, considers it an
undeniable duty to defend the unity of the nation, its flag
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the integrity of its institutions, and the good name of the
Armed Forces." [96] What the Army was saying, as Stanley
Meisler acutely observed, was that "it accepted legalization
out of patriotism but still considered itself to be a superior
political force enpowered to monitor decisions of the govern-
ment and to intervene in some way." [9 7] Yet, the Amy did
not intervene, proving the wisdom of the governments appoint-
ment to key command positions senior officers favoring demo-
cratization.
Following the promulgation of the new Constitution,
Suarez's government continued its policy of military reform.
A commission was appointed in September 19 79 to make recom-
mendations on ways of professionalizing the officer corps.
In order to control the excess officers in certain ranks,
the Defense Ministry restructured the promotion system around
one based on merit instead of seniority. As additional steps
to professionalize the Army, the Guardia Civil and the
National Police were transferred to the Ministry of the
Interior, a move discussed previously, and a civilian, Agustin
Rodriguez Sahagin, was made Minister of Defense following the
March 19 79 elections. [9 8]
Despite the efforts by Suarez and the King, many military
officers remained disturbed by the ease with which Suarez had
dismantled the institutions of Franco. In addition to their
displeasure over the legalization of the communists, the
liberal excesses that are associated with democratic societies.
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such as crime, pornography and labor strikes, fostered a
perception of moral decadence in Spain among those officers
whose values were formulated during Spain's puritannical
years and contributed to the military's uneasiness.
When the democratic euphoria subsided following the March
19 79 elections amid signs of public apathy, increased poli-
tical bickering and a general crisis of authority, conser-
vative elements within the armed forces began to assume a
more activist pose. The inability of the government and the
political parties to effectively resolve major issues con-
fronting the nation caused deep concern among these officers and
the regime's ability to govern came into question.
Critical to the growing perception of political ineffi-
ciency and instability were the related problems of regional
autonomy, which portended the break up of the Spanish state
to many officers, and terrorism. Skepticism toward the gov-
ernment and the democratic order increased as the regime and
the political parties appeared to vacillate in their response
the terrorist threat, thereby creating a right-wing pressure
within the armed forces for the restoration of law and order.
It is toward these issues, which have yet to be satisfactorily
resolved and which pose the greatest threat to political
stability in Spain, that the following chapter is directed.
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^V. AUTONOMY, TERRORISM AND THE MILITARY
Of the multitude of problems that faced the Spanish gov-
ernment following Franco's death, the related issues of
regional autonomy and terrorism have proven to be the most
intractable. It is often difficult for outsiders to grasp
the severity of the regionalist issue in Spain, for it is not
generally understood that, for most of the peninsula's history,
the structure of the Spanish government was partially con-
federal and that centralism was a product of relatively recent
times, reaching its peak during the Franco era. Regions and
nationalities are thus firmly rooted in Spanish geography
and history, having been shaped by the natural features of
the country, preserved by the confederal structure of pre-
3ourbon Spain, and politicized by the oppression of the Franco
regime.
Regionalist demands have persistently surfaced during
periods of transition or crisis. They are a major issue dur-
ing the Second Republic and the Spanish Civil War and follow-
ing years of suppression by Franco, have once again resurfaced,
accompanied this time by a wave of terrorism that has threat-
ened to tear apart the fabric of Spain's new democracy.
It is the intent of this chapter to examine the autonomy
issue in Spain. Particular attention is paid to the Suarez
regime's attempts to deal with the regionalist demands, the
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efforts of Basque terrorists to disrupt any peaceful solution
to the problem and the reaction of the Spanish military to the
devolution of power and the perceived breakdown of law and
order that has accompanied the devolution process.
A. REGIONAL AUTONOMY IN SPAIN
According to analyst Stanley Payne, "Spain's geographic
position, its lack of involvement in European diplomatic and
geopolitical rivalries, its physical obstacles to national
unity, and the undynamic pace of its modern culture, all dis-
couraged the development of a strong sense of unified Spanish
nationalism." [99] Regional nationalism, on the other hand,
although varying in intensity from area to area, has been
prevalent in varying degree throughout the history of the
Spanish state. Regionalist movements have been most active
in Catalonia, a region in northeast Spain of which Barcelona
is the capital, and the Basque provinces in the northwest.
It was from these regions that pressures for regional autonomy
confronted the Suarez government following Franco's death.
The regional autonomy issue is also a manifestation of the
traditional cleavage between center and periphery that has
characterized modern Spanish politics. The center, made up
of those provinces that comprised the historic Kingdom of
Castile, have traditionally maintained political power in
Spain and have provided the support and leadership for Spain's
centralized government. Basques and Catalans, however, have
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felt that their respective regions constitute separate
national cultures that have been economically and culturally
repressed and exploited by the central government in Madrid.
The fact that the central region until recently has been
among the least modernized areas of Spain, both socially and
economically, while both Catalonia and the Basque country
have been the most advanced and developed, has exacerbated
this tension.
1. Origins of Catalan and Basque Nationalism
The strongest claim for an ethnic identity comes from
Catalonia. Up until the Bourbon monarchy, Catalonia retained
control of its own affairs. The region was exempt from paying
taxes and from providing men to support the Castilian army,
and its language, Catalan, was the regional language of both
government and culture. The change of dynasty in the early
18th century which brought the Bourbon, Philip V, to the
Spanish throne, however, signaled the end of Catalonia's auto-
nomous status within the Spanish monarchy. The new regime
applied Castilian laws and institutions to Catalonia and most
of the rest of Spain and, as a result, for the first time in
history, these areas were integrated into a unified political
system. [100]
Catalonia's loss of political autonomy, however, was
offset by its growing economic vitality. By 1760, Catalonia
was more prosperous than Castile and the pattern of an eco-
nomically strong, but politically weak periphery and a
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politically strong but economically weak center was estab-
lished. During the crisis occassioned by the French revolu-
tion and the Napoleonic wars, Catalonia loyally supported the
monarchy. As a result, according to John Coverdale, "a work-
able equilibrium was reached in which Catalonia could parti-
cipate in a larger Spanish national undertaking without
renouncing altogether its linguistic and ethnic identity."
[101]
During the 19th century, three factors disturbed this
equilibrium and planted the seeds of modern Catalan nation-
alism. First, liberals came to power in Spain and, inspired
by Napoleonic France, imposed upon Spain a more centralized
government than it had ever known. Second, with the industrial
revolution, the economic disparity between the largely agri-
cultural center and the rapidly industrializing north grew
more pronounced. The needs of Catalonia and Madrid were no
longer harmonious, and Catalans began to view the Madrid
government with suspicion and a sense that it had become
deficient and inefficient in judgement and rule. Finally,
European romanticism and cultural nationalism encouraged
Catalans to press for restoration of the Catalan language as
the literary as well as popular language of the region. [10 2]
By the turn of the century, Catalan nationalism
assumed political foirm with parties organized to gain support
of the masses. Primarily middle class in origin and support,
Catalan nationalism gradually shifted from a right to
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left- looking movement and by the end of Primo de Rivera's
dictatorship (1930), "Accib Catalana" , the left faction of
the regionalist movement, had become a major force in Catalan
politics.
Catalan nationalism played a leading role in the
events which led to the overthrow of the Spanish monarchy
and the establishment of the Second Republic. [103] Since
supporters of the Republic favored decentralization, Catalonia
was granted its greatest measure of autonomy since the pre-
Bourbon days. In 1932, a "Statute of Autonomy" was legis-
lated that provided for a Catalan regional government, the
Generalitat to be formed which was empowered to control local
affairs, schools, social services, police, and civil legis-
lation. In addition, Catalan became "co-official" with
Castilian as the language of the region. [104]
In view of these concessions from Madrid, it was not
surprising that during the Civil War, Catalonia was one of
the major strongholds of the Republic. It is also not sur-
prising that after Franco's victory^ Catalan nationalism was
severely repressed and did not regain its forceful expression
until after Franco's death.
The historic roots of Basque nationalism are likewise
deep. The four Basque provinces of Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, Alava,
and Mavarra, retained their local customs, institutions, and
languages throughout the 16th- 18th centuries and were not as
affected by Philip V's centralizing measures as was Catalonia.
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Local questions continued to be decided locally and taxes
were negotiated with the central government and apportioned
and collected by provincial assemblies. The "fueros" or
local rights of the Basques, therefore, remained relatively
well preserved until the Carlist wars of the 19th century.
Basques actively participated in Spanish life and supported
national institutions and enterprises. Unlike their Catalan
counterparts, the Basque provinces, although linked by geo-
graphic proximity and a common languages had no common
institution nor sense of common identity. The Basque language
was limited to domestic usage and Castilian had been used as
the language of culture and government since the Middle Ages.
[105]
Basque displeasure with Madrid first surfaced during
the 19th century when the Spanish government's liberal-central-
ism challenged Basque autonomy. Basque "fueros" were a major
issue in the Carlist Wars, and Basques formed the backbone of
the Carlist resistance to liberalism. In the end, liberals
in the capital limited the extent of Basque autonomy in favor
of Madrid centralism. Basques still retained the right to
negotiate taxes and collect them locally but lost most of their
other privileges. [106]
An organized Basque nationalist movement emerged
toward the end of the 19th century when Sabino Arena Goiri
founded the "Partido Nacionalista Vasco" (Basque Nationalist
Party) or PNV in 189 4. Arona's nationalism was deeply Catholic
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and conservative and focused principally on the Basque lan-
guage and a desire to preserve the ethnic purity of the Basque
people. It remained a small movement however, for as John
Coverdale explained, "the relatively small size of the region,
the weakness of its linguistic base, the integration of
Basque elites into national economic and political life . .
.
prohibited the PNV from recruiting mass support prior to the
proclamation of the Republic." [107]
Like Catalonia, the Basque region (less Navarra, an
area of mixed Basque, Castilian and Catalan population which
rejected the statute) was granted autonomy under the Republic.
Unlike Catalonia, however, Basque nationalism remained Catholic
and conservative in its orientation and when the Civil War
broke out, Basque nationalists were confronted with a serious
dilemma. Their political and social conservatism made them
the natural allies of Franco, yet, their regional aspirations
dictated that they support the Republic. In the end, region-
alist sentiment prevailed in A lava, Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa,
which supported the Republic, while Navarra sided with Franco.
[108]
After the war, which ended for the Basques in 19 37,
all privileges in those provinces that supported the Republic
were lost as Franco began a campaign to uproot the remnants
of Basque nationalism. Navarra, on the other hand, because
of its loyalty to Franco, was permitted to retain its "fueros".
The separation of Navarra from the other Basque provinces was a
distinction which still clouds Basque politics today.
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2. Franco and National Unity
It can be argued that the autonomy problem confront-
ing Spain's democratic government is a Franco legacy. Deter-
mined to preserve the national unity of Spain and intent on
punishing those regions who opposed him during the Civil War,
Franco conducted a repressive campaign to stamp out Basque
and Catalan nationalism and culture.
Franco's nationalism was essentially defensive and
counter-revolutionary. According to Stanley Payne, it was
"a response to the devisiveness and revolutionary anti- tradi-
tionalism of the left more than the expression of a sponta-
neous and unified assertion of Spanish nationalism on the
peninsular or international level." "Thus, the (Franco)
government," Payne concluded, "has proven psychologically and
culturally unable to absorb the sympathies of regional nation-
alists on the peripheries of Spain, despite, or because of,
the coercive means at its disposal." [109]
At first, regionalism was a complete anathema to
Franco. Publication and education in regional languages was
banned. Non-Castilian books were taken from libraries and
burned, and street signs in Basque and Catalan were torn down.
Celebrations of historic dates in regional history were
suppressed by Franco's police. As the Franco regime attempted
to shed some of its more obvious authoritarian aspects in
the 19 50's and 19 60 's, however it gradually relaxed its re-
strictions on the use of regional languages. Books and
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periodicals could appear once again and schools were eventually
allowed to teach the regional language. Castilian remained
the language of instruction for all other subjects, however,
and the regions continued to be governed from Madrid without
any concession to Catalan or Basque aspirations for control
of their own affairs. [110]
In Catalonia, Franco's repression drove regionalist
groups into coalition with other expressions of anti-Franco
sentiment. The most general grudge held by Catalans remained
linguistic and cultural, especially among the Catalan writers
and intellectuals who felt that their native language was
threatened with extinction. Another grudge, heard mostly in
Barcelona, concerned taxes and centered around the question
of why inhabitants of industrial areas had to pay higher
taxes yet received a disproportionatly small share of the
benefits from Madrid. Furthermore, a sense of economic
superiority developed in Catalonia which, along with the
Basque country, had set the pace of Spain's modernization.
As a result, "the disproportion between political and econom-
ic power caused by the relative economic weakness of the
political center contributed to the discontent of the periphery
which felt its interests would be better served by a decen-
tralized system in which decisions affecting the region could
be taken at the regional level." [Ill]
While Catalans possessed a strong sense of ethnic
identity, the Basques, on the other hand, were not as firm
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in their linguistic and cultural ties. Whereas the Catalan
provincial dialect is a romance language and easily adapted
to contemporary culture, Euskera, with its obscure roots, is
extremely hard either to learn or adapt. As a 19 70 survey
indicated, only forty nine percent of the housewives in the
Basque country were able to understand their regional lan-
guage compared to ninety percent in Catalonia. [112] The
large influx of workers from other parts of Spain that accom-
panied the Basque region's industrialization further diluted
the Basque identity. Franco's repression, however, more than
other factors, solidified the inherently weak Basque nation-
alist movement and rallied non-nationalists to the regionalists
'
cause
.
The more difficult Franco made it for the Basuqes
to pursue the "Euzko" way of life, the more they clung to it.
As George Hills observed, "there were more 'Euzkaldunak ' and
•Euzkaltzalek ' - speakers and lovers of the Basque language -
when after 30 years (Franco) was forced to relax his prohi-
bition of it than at any time these last two centuries." In
addition, the severity of Franco's repressive measures,
particularly against striking Basque workers, convinced many
non Basques that the regionalists were right and "all evil"
did in fact stem from Madrid. By the time of Franco's death,
the Basque traditional desire, "to be left alone and in peace
and to fight for that peace," had gained widespread support
among immigrants as well as natives. [113]
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Despite Franco's repression, regionalism remained an
active political force in the Basque country and Catalonia.
With the loosening of the restraints that prohibited the
manifestation of regional differences under the Franco regime,
regionalists once more gave forceful expression to their
demands. Accompanied by a rise in terrorism by Basque ex-
tremists, these demands were a major issue that needed
resolution by Spain's new democrative government.
3
.
Spanish Democracy and Devolution
Following Franco's death, demands for autonomy were
coupled with demands for political amnesty. The amnesty issue
was particularly important to the Basques. An upsurge of
Basque nationalist activity and terrorism in the late Franco
years resulted in the arrest of many Basque activists. The
general pardon announced by the government to mark Juan Carlos
'
ascension as king and the amnesty granted by the Suarez gov-
ernment in July 1976 did not extend to all political prisoners
and excluded many Basque terrorists. Basque protests con-
tinued throughout this period, demanding full amnesty for all
political prisoners. The violence that accompanied police
efforts to control these demonstrations, marches, and strikes
alienated many moderate Basques- and fostered more hatred of
the police and Guardia Civil among the Basque populace which
further fueled the fires of Basque nationalism. The govern-
ment, in an effort to calm the domestic scene prior to the
June 19 77 parliamentary elections, eventually offered exile
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to those activists and terrorists who were still in
prison.
As the parliamentary elections approached, local
political groups and parties proliferated in the Basque
country. Virtually all parties that presented candidates
for election supported autonomy in one form or another. The
traditional Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) , which had dom-
inated Basque politics during the republic, combined its
centrist economic and social policies with a vigorous demand
for autonomy, calling for the immediate restoration of the
statute of autonomy granted Basques by the Republic in 19 36.
The PNV was highly visible in Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya but
failed to generate much enthusiasm in the other two Basque
provinces of Alava and Navarra. [114]
In Catalonia, the proliferation of local and regional
parties was likewise great. As in the Basque country, regional
autonomy was a dominant theme in most political speeches, and
no party that showed any strength in the region failed to
support it.
The major parties with a national following, with
the exception of the right-wing Alianza Popular (AP) , also
endorsed some measure of regional autonomy in an effort to
gain support in Spain's highly industrialized and populated
regions. The Socialists (PSOE) and the Communists (PCE) both
stressed their commitment to a federal structure for Spain.
The center UCD was vague and cautious in its declarations
76

about autonomy, but did proclaim its commitment to regional
autonomy "for all regions whose history, geography, and
economic situation might lead them to deserve it," [115]
The rejection of the Francoist right in the elections
was interpreted in Basque country and Catalonia as an endorse-
ment for regional autonomy. The response of the new govern-
ment to the autonomy demands was progressive but cautious.
Premier Suarez was forced to walk a fine line between granting
measures of autonomy to appease regional pressure and assur-
ing forces of the right that the integrity of the Spanish
state would remain intact. Complicating the picture and over-
shadowing the entire devolution process was the growing
terrorism of the leftist ETA, the most extreme expression of
Basque nationalism. The ETA consistently rejected any con-
stitutional arrangement short of complete independence for
the Basque provinces and state socialism. Government measures
to neutralize the terrorists, which included some heavy-handed
tactics by the police and Guardia Civil, exacerbated tensions
between the region and Madrid and made the resolution of the
Basque autonomy question all the more difficult.
The first step the government took to resolve the
autonomy problem following the June 19 77 elections was to
grant pre-autonomy status to those regions which desired it.
In essence, this measure was largely symbolic and was meant
as a pledge for true autonomy after the new constitution was
approved.
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In Catalonia, the statute re-established the General-
itat and Josep Tarradellas, the elderly leader of the Catalan
government-in-exile, returned as its President (October 24,
1977)
.
Although the Generalitat had no real legislative power
and was primarily consultive in function, its restoration
signified recognition of the distinctive political character
of the region and an awareness of Catalan demands for autonomy,
Tarradellas and other Catalan nationalists were apparently
pleased with the gesture and content to wait until the new
Constitution was approved for more definitive autonomy
measures. [116]
The government's negotiations with the Basques over
a similar pre-autonomy statute, on the other hand, ran into
some serious problems. The Basques demanded a measure of
fiscal autonomy immediately and the inclusion of the province
of Navarra into the Basque region. Saarez and the Basques
eventually compromised and drafted a statute that included
a vague reference to the "desirability of future fiscal
autonomy" but foresaw the incorporation of Navarra into the
Basque region. Problems with this draft arose, however, since
a substantial number of Navarese wanted no part of their
province's inclusion in the Basque region. Demonstrations
and counter-demonstrations were staged, the ETA threatened
more violence, and the UCD delegates from Navarra pressured
the government to preserve their province from inclusion in
an autonomous Basque region. The issue was resolved, at
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least temporarily, by both sides agreeing that a referendum
in Navarra should decide the issue. [117]
If the government expected the pre-autonomy statute
and the subsequent formation of a Basque council to dampen
unrest in the Basque country, it was mistaken. Unlike the
Catalans, the Basques were unwilling to take these symbolic
gestures as a pledge of real autonomy after the Constitution
was approved. Marches, demonstrations, and terrorist vio-
lence continued throughout 19 7 8 as politics in the Basque
country became increasingly polarized and radicalized. The
Armed Police reaction to the terrorism became increasingly
repressive and violent, instigating new protests and demands
from Basques for the government to get its police under
control.
Political power in the Basque country following the
June 19 77 elections was shared by the PSOE, the UCD and the
PNV, with the PNV and PSOE combining forces in support of
Basque autonomy. (Table 3)
Table 3: Basque Country, Election to Congress
of Deputies, June 1977 [118]
Party or
Group
PSOE
PNV
UCD
extreme left
AP
all others
Percent of Number
Popular Vote of Seats
24.9 9
23.4 8
15.8 7
11.0 I
7.2
17.7
1
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Although PNV leaders regularly condemned ETA violence
and assassinations, they were reluctant to support government
actions to bring them to a halt. To some observers, this
was an indication that the PNV was not clear on what role
they saw ETA violence playing in the advancement of their own
aims. El Pais
, a liberal Madrid daily, for example, charged
the PNV with encouraging, consciously or otherwise, a policy
which, in the final analysis, gave much support to the terror-
ists actions. [119] It was possible that the PNV sought to
utilize ETA violence as leverage to extract greater political
concessions from Madrid. PNV demands that an autonomous
Basque police force replace the hated Guardia Civil and Armed
Police, for example, seemed to support this possibility. It
is also debatable whether the PNV had a clear conception of
what its short-term and long-term goals were. Obviously in
favor of Basque autonomy, there was some indication, however,
that PNV nationalists desired something more. A PNV procla-
mation signed on the Basque national day (March 26, 1978),
desiring recognition of Basque "sovereignty" as an essential
precondition to the pacification of the region, indicated a
growing radicalization of Basque demands.
The new Spanish Constitution, drafted during this
period and signed into force in December 19 78, insisted on
the "indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation" but also
recognized and guaranteed "the right to autonomy of the
nationalities and regions which comprised it" (Article 2)
.
The Constitution provided several mechnisms by which autonomy
80

could be reached and listed in detail the powers that could
be devolved to the regions (Article 148) and the powers and
rights to be exclusively retained by the state (Article 149)
.
In essence, it allowed the regions of Catalonia and the
Basque country to develop autonomy rather quickly while the
process for other regions desiring some measure of local
government would be much slower.
For the Basques and the Catalans, the road to autonomy
was through application of Article 151. Commissions represent-
ing the regions met with those representing the Cortes to
draft statutes of autonomy. These statutes were accepted by
regional referendum in October 1979 and subsequently ratified
by the Cortes and by the King. Elections for the newly created
regional governments were held in May 19 80.
Negotiations with Catalonia over the draft statute
were essentially straightforward and subject to little or no
criticism. [120] Negotiations between the Basques and the
government, on the other hand, were particularly difficult.
To many Basques the government appeared to be dragging its
feet on autonomy while a rise of ETA terrorism complicated
the process. Also disturbing to the government was the
emergence of a new radical Basque party, the "Herri Batasuna"
(One Homeland) which garnered one- third of the nationalist
vote in the March 19 79 elections and threatened to vie with
the more moderate PNV for Basque leadership. [121]
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Negotiations improved that summer when moderate
Carlos Guraicoectexa was elected President of the Basque
Council and Suarez himself assumed the role of expediter and
took charge of the negotiating process.
The new autonomy statute was generous to the Basques,
who received what they asked for short of independence and
within the constraints of the Constitution. The statute
granted the new Basque Autonomous Community (Alava, Vizcaya
and Guipuzcoa) the power through its parliament and government
to decide for itself matters relating to a wide variety of
political, social, and economic affairs. They were granted
their own police force, powers to raise and spend taxes,
powers over industrial and economic policy, town and country
planning, energy resources, public works, agriculture and
fisheries, social services, culture and state savings banks.
In addition, the statute reaffirmed that the Navarra question
would be settled by referendum. In exchange for these rights,
the Basques accepted Spanish sovereignty over the region and
the powers reserved for the State as delineated in Article
149 of the Constitution. [122]
Implementation of the provisions of the Basque autonomy
statute was slow, however, with the Suarez government showing
no sense of urgency in the process of devolving to the com-
munity the promised administrative functions. In January
19 80, PNV representatives to the Cortes walked out of the
Spanish parliament to protest the government's foot
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dragging. [123] The regional elections of March 19 80 were
a further indication of Basque disaffection with ^Madrid. Both
major 'Spanish' parties, the UCD and PSOE, were heavy losers
while the PNV gained 38% of the vote, up from 27% in the 1979
elections, and emerged as the predominant political power in
the Basque country. [124]
The Basque autonomy issue was a political headache
for Suarez and his UCD government. The political right,
which criticized the Suarez government for attempting to
balkanize Spain, pressured Suarez to slow down the decentral-
ization process. The cabinet's decision in January 19 80 to
forestall Andalusian autonomy was a calculated move to ease
this pressure. Although this decision probably cost the UCD
votes in this impoverished region it was hoped that a corres-
ponding gain in Spain's Castilian heartland would be more than
offsetting. [125]
In negotiations with the Basques, tax privileges and
the formation of a Basque police force proved to be the most
serious stumbling blocks in implementing the Autonomy Statute.
Throughout 19 80 negotiations over the transfer of these powers
were slow and tortuous bringing charges of paternalism and
lack of good faith against the government by Garaicoectexa
the current President of the Basque government. Unable to
put a clamp on Basque terrorism, which continued despite the
autonomy statute, and facing the loss of political credibility
not only among Basques but also from among the Spanish right
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and left, Suarez eventually decided to gamble on Garaicoectexa
and the PNV to govern and eventually pacify the troubled
region. In January 19 81, a breakthrough was achieved when an
agreement between the two parties on Basque fiscal powers was
reached and a new impetus was given to getting a Basque police
force established. [126] If the past was any guide, however,
technical hitches and misunderstandings could have delayed or
complicated the carrying out of these agreements. As it hap-
pened, the February 19 81 coup attempt forced both sides to
temporarily accept a slowdown in the devolution process.
The government's biggest headache, by far has been
terrorism. Throughout the entire devolution process, ETA
terrorism has been a serious complicating factor. It has
provoked a right wing backlash, fostered anti-Madrid sentiment
in the Basque country, alienated Spanish military and law
enforcement agencies, brought into question the government's
ability to govern, and encouraged demands for the declaration
of a state of emergency in the Basque region and for military
intervention to preserve law and order. The Suarez govern-
ment's inability to resolve the problem cost Suarez political
support, contributed to his decision to resign, and set the
stage for the February 19 81 coup attempt. To appreciate the
impact of the ETA and terrorism on the Spanish political
climate, a closer look at its organization, goals, tactics
and effectiveness is in order.
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B. THE THREAT FROM THE LEFT - THE ETA
As the principal "angel of death" of the Spanish ultra-
left, the Marxist, Basque, separatist, organization, "Euzkadi
ta Azkatasuna"
, (Basque Homeland and Liberty) or ETA, ori-
ginated in 19 5 2 as a propaganda organ for the then illegal
PNV. This new group, initially comprised of radical university
students, became disenchanted with the passivity of the mod-
erate PNV and grew increasingly militant as it moved further
and farther to the left. In 19 58, the ETA broke away from
the PNV, and by 19 66 it had become an avowedly Marxist, ter-
rorist, regionalist organization. It advocated revolutionary
violence, a federation of Basque provinces on both sides of
the Pyrenees independent of Spain and France, and a new social
order based upon some ill-defined form of Basque socialism.
[127]
The ETA's fifth congress in 1967 produced a split between
the more nationalist and more socialist factions of the group,
with the nationalists claiming that the fight, against Spain
and for Basque freedom, was to have precedence over developing
a worker-based socialist homeland. The sixth congress of
1970 ratified this split, with the radical nationalists taking
the name ETA V (reflecting their claim of the legality of
the fifth congress) and the more Marxist-socialist faction
the title ETA VI. ETA VI opted for political work among Basque
factory workers while the ETA V embarked upon a campaign of
terrorism and violence to achieve Basque independence. [128]
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Shooting between the Guardia Civil and Basque activists
marked the outbreak of violence in 1968. The ETA V, in an
act of revenge, killed a hated police inspector, and the
Franco regime responded with indiscriminate and widespread
arrests. This made the police forces more detested than ever
and increased popular sympathy for the ETA. Since then a
running war has been maintained between the ETA and the police,
a war that has continued up to the present.
It should be noted here, that the Basque hatred of Spain's
internal security forces has always been and continues to be
one of the underlying factors that lends legitimacy (if not
support) to the ETA. Members of the Guardia Civil and Armed
Police are never assigned to their home provinces and are
generally discouraged from socializing with the local popula-
tion of their garrison. As a result, in the Basque country
the forces of law and order are non-Basques. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the Guardia Civil has been regarded
by many Basques as an army of occupation and the chief re-
pressive arm of the regime.
Violence mounted during the last years of the Franco
regime, culminating with the ETA V's assassination of Prime
Minister Carrero Blanco in December 1973. This bold stroke,
which established the ETA ' s terrorist reputation, provoked
Franco to strike back brutally. Mass arrests, military trials
without appeal, and executions made Spain appear at the time
of Franco's death to be more openly repressive than it had been
in many years.
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Throughout Spain's transition to democracy ETA violence
continued with hundreds of people falling victim to terrorism.
In 19 77, however, the ETA once again split into two factions.
A more "moderate" faction, the ETA-politico/militar (ETA-p/m)
believed it was necessary to link armed struggle with above
ground political activity. The military wing, ETA-militar
(ETA-m)
, remained pessimistic about political change and pur-
sued a purely violent strategy.
From the beginning, the ETA-m has refused to accept the
possibility of democratic change in Spain and has geared its
terrorism toward thwarting democratic reform and any peaceful
moves toward autonomy in the Basque country. To ETA militants,
Spanish democracy is an anathema. In a communique following
the June 1977 parliamentary elections, the ETA-militar had
this to say about Spain's new democracy; "The ETA believes
that its actions will not destabilize the democracy because
there is no democracy in Spain. We have the same military
dictatorship only with a smile... our people understand now
that the elections were nothing more than a fraud to legiti-
mate as democratic a regime that is fundamentally a military
dictatorship." [129]
In a free and open society, ETA terrorists would be rebels
without a cause, for deliverance from oppression could no
longer be offered to the Basque people as the rationale for
bloodshed and brute force. ETA gunmen are not primarily
champions of an ideology. They champion their cause to
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potential supporters more by reference to years of oppression
than by claiming to offer solutions to today's problems. They
draw their power from links of blood, not ideas, and from the
great appeal of nationalism.
The ETA-m subscribes to the theory that violence will pro-
voke repression, repression more violence, with tiie viscious
circle continuing and becoming wider and wider. Their ulti-
mate goal remains an independent, socialist Basque nation.
As long as progress toward Basque autonomy and democracy con-
tinues, however, they realize that they will never get the
support of the moderate Basque majority. Their only hope,
therefore, is to incite repression from Madrid by provoking
the Army into a coup which would alienate the Basque majority
and rekindle the fires of Basque nationalism.
In an effort to get Spain's security forces to shoot back
wildly and to incite a military reprisal, the targets of the
ETA's assassins have been predominantly military and police
personnel. Victims have ranged from off-duty Guardia Civil
patrolmen to Army generals and a Supreme Court Justice.
The murder of Madrid's military governor. General Con-
stantino Ortin Gil, on January 3, 19 79, is indicative of the
ETA's motives. General Ortin was typical of the non-poli-
tical backbone of Spain's officer corps which has respected
the King's injunction to stay aloof from politics during the
country's transition from dictatorship to democracy. His
assassination was clearly meant to provoke unrest among this
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faction of the military and create additional pressure for
military intervention in Spain's politics. [130] Further-
more, every attack on the Army made it much more difficult
for the Suarez government (because it did not want to seem
to be yielding to terrorist pressure) to concede greater
measures of autonomy to the Basques. For the ETA, failure
of a peaceful devolution process meant, increased tolerance
(if not support) for their cause among the Basque populace.
Every measure of progress toward democracy or peaceful
settlement of the Basque problem was countered by an ETA act
of violence. Between Franco's death and the June 19 77 elec-
tions, sixty-seven Spaniards died from political violence,
primarily at the hands of the ETA. [131] In 1978, a year
of large-scale ETA offensives, ETA violence reached a cres-
cendo prior to the December constitutional referendum. During
the month of November along, ETA terrorists killed fifteen
and wounded nineteen others. [13 2]
Likewise, there was no mistaking the ETA-m's purpose as
Basque autonomy drew near in 1979. According to Manuel
Azcarate of the PCE , as quoted by Claire Sterling in her
book The Terror Network , "they (ETA) want the prisons over-
flowing with Basques again, screams from the torture chambers,
the martyrs stigmata. They want Spanish tanks in the streets
of Bilbao." They wanted to "Ulsterize Euzkadi," said the
militars themselves, referring to the wonders done by Ulster's
provisional IRA to keep peace forever out of Northern Ireland.
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[13 3] In 1980 violence continued, with the ETA claiming
responsibility for killing more than ninety people in Spain.
[134]
Given this level of violence, how effective has the ETA-m
been in achieving its goals? Despite the ETA's terrorism, a
transition to democracy has been made and Basque autonomy
granted. On the other hand, the ETA has been successful in
provoking a public outcry in the Basque country against the
government forces of law and order. Basque support of the
ETA, however, is tenuous at best, especially as the reality
of autonomy draws near. Most Basques resolutely seek home
rule, but are moderately conservative socially, economically
and religiously. They find the ETA's violent Marxism an
anathema and have no desire to jeopardize their high standard
of living for the ill-defined, radical socioeconomic order the
ETA advocates.
Given its lack of popular support, there is little like-
lihood that the ETA could overthrow Spanish democracy on its
own. The only way for them to achieve power would be in the
aftermath of another right-wing dictatorship. The extreme
right, although it also lacks popular support, could ride to
power on the coattails of a mutinous military. It has been
toward the goal of provoking a military coup in Spain that the
ETA's efforts have been directed. A military coup that would
topple Spain's democratic government and alienate its citizens
against Madrid is the ETA's only hope for success.
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C. THE REACTION OF THE RIGHT - THE MILITARY
From the start of Spain's transition to democracy. King
Juan Carlos recognized the danger a disaffected military
posed to Spain's democratic evolution. In February and April
19 77, the King issued decrees forbidding the military to
participate in politics or to show public preference for the
political options being presented to the nation. It did not
take long, however, for the effects of Basque terrorism to
cause a reaction from the Spanish armed forces.
In September 1977 a group of important generals met to
discuss how to save Spain from chaos, a leftist takeover, and
fragmentation by Basque and Catalan nationalists. Included
in this group were Generals Santiago and Iniesta, who were
previously retired by Juan Carlos because of their intran-
sigent resistance to political reform, and General Jaime
Milans del Bosch, commander of a tank division near Madrid
and an officer who would play an important role in the Feb-
ruary 19 81 coup attempt. Of particular concern to these
generals was the ETA's fight for an independent Basque home-
land. While the generals did not oppose self-rule in the
region so long as autonomy was compatible with national unity,
the dissolution of the Spanish state would be intolerable
and would surely provoke a military response. It was with
this in mind that Lieutenant General Mellado, the Minister
of Defense, announced at a parade of airborne troops in the
spring of 1978 that Spain's unity was indivisible, and that
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this unity in no way would be permitted to be broken.
[1351
As Basque assassinations of security and military person-
nel continued, the government's relations with the military,
paramilitary and police forces began to deteriorate. The
killing of four law enforcement officers in a single day in
August 1978 drew a sharp note from the Professional Police
Association (APP) that criticized the government, the poli-
tical parties, and the trade unions for failing to support
the police and thereby contributing to the violence that was
taking its toll among Spanish law enforcement officers. [136]
On October 13, 1978, ETA terrorists killed two police-
men in Bilboa, bringing the total for the year to 23 including
seven in the span of three weeks. At the funeral of their
comrades, according to John Coverdale, "some eight hundred
of the two thousand members of the Armed Police assigned to
Bilbao, staged a demonstration and a sit-in in which they
insulted the inspector of the Armed Police, the director
general of security and other officials attending the funeral."
[137]
Under the strain of the increased tempo of terrorist
activity, the discipline of the armed forces appeared to be
cracking. In November 1973, a mini-coup attempt was uncovered
which apparently included plans to kill Premier Suarez and
at least two other cabinet ministers. On the night of
November 16, army investigators arrested Guardia Civil
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colonel who would lead the seizure of the Cortes in February
19 81, and Armed Police Captain Ricardo Saenz, thereby breaking
up the plot. [138]
Additional pressure on the government from the military
to restore law and order in Spain came in the aftermath of
General Ortin's assassination in January 19 79. As reported
in the Economist
,
at General Ortin's funeral "a crowd of some
two hundred right-wingers had a field day, chanting Spain,
yes
,
democracy, no, and burning Basque flags while a group
of officers seized the coffin and paraded it down the street
shouting anti-government slogans." [139] This display
brought the sternest rebuke yet from King Juan Carlos who
dressed down his senior officers by making it quite clear that
the lack of discipline in the military was a far more serious
threat to the state than the inevitable political errors of
the government. [140] The King's admonition did not stop
General Milans del Bosch, however, from complaining publicly
"that terrorism was not receiving an adequate response and
that the array must intervene when legislative, police and
judicial measures were seen to be inefficient." [141]
The Suarez government was placed under extreme pressure
on two fronts. The military and security forces demanded
more freedom to combat Basque terrorism, while the Basque
populace demanded greater control over security personnel and
a step up in the autonomy process. Government vacillation
brought charges of foot dragging from both sides and
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contributed to a loss of political credibility for Suarez
and his government. His inability to effectively control
terrorism left Suarez open to criticism from both the political
left and right. This growing perception of a government
incapable of governing colored the events that led to Suarez'
resignation and the February 19 81 coup attempt.
The influence of the Spanish political right among dis-
affected military officers has increased as a consequence of
Spain's terrorist problem. The leader of the Spanish right
is Manuel Fraga Iribaine, a former Franco minister and head
of the Popular Alliance. His initial campaign rhetoric
focused on a "reds or us" syndrome did not go over well
with Spanish voters anxious to bury the Civil War hatchet and
to get on with democracy. In response to the increased level
of political violence in Spain, however, Fraga shifted his
attention to the deterioration of public order, criticizing
the Suarez government for the lack of law and order in Spain
and for its failure to "protect" Spanish unity. His party has
gained the ear of a number of disaffected military officers
by playing on the military fears of Basque secessionism and
by exploiting the indignation aroused by terrorist attacks
on military and police targets. [142]
To the right of Fraga, are several groups of the "ultra-
right" who have used the violence of the ultra-left as justi-
fication for their own brand of terrorism. Organizations
like the neo-fascist New Force Party and the nazi-styled
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Falange party have launched a campaign of assassination and
terrorist in the northern Basque provinces with ETA supporters
and sympathizers their primary victims. In 19 80, right-wing
violence took twenty-one lives - most of them in the Basque
country - including a nineteen year old Basque girl who was
kidnapped and interrogated as a suspected ETA informer prior
to being brutally murdered. [14 3]
What has disturbed many Spaniards has been the persistent
rumor that the ultra-right terrorists were linked secretly
to Spain's security forces. Coupled with the perceived no-
tion that the government was unwilling to investigate terror-
ism of the right with as much zeal and determination as it
did terrorism of the left, this rumor has been used to sub-
stantiate charges that the government was bowing to right-wing
pressure. [144]
By the end of 19 80, therefore, Basque terrorism an an
increasingly unhappy military, had placed Suarez in a poli-
tically uncomfortable position. His abrupt resignation as
Prime Minister in January 19 81 and the unsuccessful military
coup in February brought into sharp focus the fragile state
of Spain's democracy. The coup, its aftermath, and the
government's efforlis to defuze the military threat and restore
Spain's democratic viability are the subjects of analysis
in the following chapter.
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V. THE MILITARY AND DEMOCRACY
By the end of 19 80, the UCD government headed by Adolf
o
Suarez had shown itself unable to deal with the terrorist
campaign carried on by the ETA. Furthermore, Suarez, himself,
was under fire from within his own party which had lost its
cohesiveness in the face of Spain's mounting political prob-
lems and stagnating economy.
Given to periods of melancholy and isolation and perhaps
feeling that he no longer had the confidence of either the
King or his party, Suarez resigned as Spain's Prime Minister
on January 29, 1981. [145] In a television address to the
nation, Suarez gave few clues to his reasons for resigning
but left the impression that he felt that he had reached the
limit of his usefulness.
The almost five years I have been Prime Minister has
taken alot out of me. No other person throughout the
last one hundred and fifty years has governed demo-
cratically for such a long time. What I have given
of myself has served to put together a system of free-
doms, a new model of social coexistance and a new
model of state... But as frequently happens in history,
to carry on with a job in hand requires a change of
persons. And I do not want the democratic system... to
become just one more interlude in the history of Spain.
[146]
The possibility has subsequently been raised that Suarez,
informed by the Spanish intelligence services that a military
plot was afoot, hoped to forestall a coup by removing himself
from the political scene. [147] According to James Markham
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of the New York Times
, highly placed Spanish sources stated
that senior military officials demanded that Juan Carlos
remove Suarez from office but that the king rejected their
entreaties as unconstitutional. [148] Whatever his inten-
tions, Sua'rez' resignation left an internally divided UCD
party and a sizeable political vacuum.
It was within this context that King Juan Carlos embarked
on his first trip to the Basque country in early February
1981. The King's visit was taken against the advice of sev-
eral senior military officers who opposed the visit on the
grounds that it consecrated Basque autonomy. With his dig-
nified and cool approach to separatist hecklers, and his firm
endorsement of Basque self-government, however, Juan Carlos
made a seemingly important contribution to turning Basque
opinion away from the ETA and its dreams of an independent
Basque nation. [149]
Whatever advantages the government gained from the King's
visit were quickly lost, however, when a suspected Basque
terrorist died in a Madrid jail, an apparent victim of police
torture. [150] His death triggered a general strike which
paralyzed industrial and commercial activity in the Basque
region. The government dismissed or arrested the police
officers involved, but this action did not deter the strike
nor prevent several senior police officers, angry at the
criticism that was directed at the police from resigning.
[151]
97

This growing tension made the parliamentary endorsement
of Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, the new prime minister designate,
all the more difficult. Nominated as Suarez' successor by
the UCD on February 9th and endorsed by the King on the 10th,
Calvo Sotelo was unable to win an absolute majority in a
parliamentary vote of confidence on February 20, 1981. Gain-
ing the support of only four deputies outside his own party,
Sotelo was opposed by the Communists^ Socialists and the
regional parties of Basque country and Andalusia while the
political right generally abstained rather than go on record
as supporting a UCD administration. [152]
It was against this background that some two hundred
members of the Guardia Civil led by Lieutenant Colonel Tejero
de Molina took over the Spanish parliament on the afternoon
of February 23, 1981 as the Cortes was preparing for second
vote on Calvo Sotelo 's new government. This takeover marked
the beginning of the most serious attempt at a military coup
in the history of Spain's young democracy.
A. THE FEBRUARY COUP AND ITS AFTERMATH
Given the circumstances, it was not surprising that dis-
enchanted elements within the military and Guardia Civil
believed that the moment for a coup was a propitious one.
Years of terrorist activity had taken its toll of military
and Guardia Civil members and the recent criticism of the
police by the civilian population and the government had
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shortened a number of officers' tempers. To many military
officers, it seemed that Spain was on the edge of chaos. The
government appeared to be incapable of restoring law and
order, and with the resignation of Suarez it was questionable
whether an effective government could be formed at all with-
out first calling a general election. Such an election would
have favored the Socialists and could have possibly led to
a left-wing government in Spain that would have further
alienated the Spanish military.
Colonel Tejero's occupation of the Cortes was the first
stage of what was essentially a four stage plan. The other
stages included, the rallying of Spain's regional military
commanders by General Jaime Milans del Bosch, commander of
the Valencia region, to support the dissolution of parlia-
ment and the creation of a military government in Spain; the
occupation of key strategic installations (including the
national radio and television center) by Madrid's "Brunete"
armored division; and, finally, the acceptance by King Juan
Carlos of a military-backed government headed by General
Alfonso Armada, the deputy chief of the general staff and for
twenty-six years the King's closest military advisor. [153]
Of the four stages, only Tejero's seizure was successful.
General Milans del Bosch's involvement in the coup was
apparent early on as he declared a state of martial law in
Valencia and rolled his tanks into the streets. However,
he was unable to convince the remainder of Spain's regional
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commanders to follow his lead. Most of them were content to
"sit on the fence" until the position of the King could be
ascertained and the chances of the coup's success assessed.
A unit of the Brunete Division managed to occupy Radio Madrid
momentarily, but the majority of the division refused to take
part in the insurrection. [154]
The principal weakness of the plot and the reason why the
coup failed, however, was that the plotters totally misjudged
the King's commitment to democracy. They assumed that Juan
Carlos, faced with a fait accompli, would accept General
Armada's ultimatum and throw in his lot with the military.
When Juan Carlos flatly refused, the plotters had no answer.
By cajoling, orders, and threats, the King ensured that his
regional commanders knew exactly where he stood and that he
was not considering backing the rebels as Generals Milans
and Armada had been claiming. Shortly after midnight on the
night of the coup, Juan Carlos appeared in his army uniform,
and in a nationwide television address pledged his faith in
democracy and warned all military commanders to heed the
orders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who were totally loyal to
the King. A few minutes later. General Milans withdrew his
tanks from the streets of Valencia and by noon the next day.
Colonel Tejero, realizing that the plot had failed to
generate support, surrendered. [155]
Not only did the plotters misjudge the King and the per-
sonal loyalty most senior and middle grade officers felt
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toward Juan Carlos, they also misread the temper of the
country and the depth of its discontent. As Eusebio Mujal-
Leon observed, "discontent certainly existed and many
Spaniards desired far greater order in civic life, but there
was no mass support for those who wished to bring such order
by returning to dictatorship." [156]
Indeed, throughout Spain vocal and visible support for
democracy prevailed as millions of people took to the streets
of Spain's major cities on February 27 to demonstrate their
defense of liberty, democracy and the Constitution. Even in
Basque country, the mood was tranquil and in a surprise move,
the political arm of the ETA (ETA-P/M) announced an uncondi-
tional cease fire and released unharmed three foreign consuls
they had abducted following the police torture incident. (The
military wing of the ETA however, ambushed tiiree policemen
in Bilbao hours after the cease fire was announced.) [157]
The post-putsch euphoria was short-lived however, as the
reality of the recent events sunk in. What was particularly
alarming to many Spaniards was that only one man, the King,
stood between the plotters and their goal. It was painfully
obvious that this situation would not be repeated, for if
there were to be another coup attempt, the first target, not
the last, would be the King. If democracy were to survive,
the other institutions of government, the executive and the
parliament, needed to be strengthened while the institutional
power of the military and security forces required limitation.
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Although the military lacked the backing of the people, they
nonetheless possessed armed strength required to topple Spain's
democratic government.
B. DEFUSING THE MILITARY THREAT - HARDLINE OR APPEASEMENT?
The parliamentary approval of Calvo Sotelo and his new
government took place a few days after the coup attempt with
the new Prime Minister receiving an absolute majority of the
vote. The most immediate problem facing the new government
was how to defuse the threat the military obviously posed to
Spain's democracy. The grievances that prompted members of
the military and Civil Guard to rebel were not going to
disappear just because the coup failed. Instead, they would
require resolution to avoid a reoccurance of February's mutiny
and to shore up Spain's fragile democracy.
The dilemma faced by King Juan Carlos and his Prime
Minister, however, was that even though Spain's military and
security forces were a source of danger, they were also a
necessity. Institutionally, these were powerful organizations
that had resisted change and reform. Their cooperation and
services were going to be required, however, if the govern-
ment was to be successful in restoring law and order in Spain
and in regaining the confidence of the people. In short,
the government faced two fundamental choices. It could take
a hard line toward the military and security forces and
thoroughly reform both institutions, an act which would, in
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all probability, alienate moderate officers who had remained
loyal to the King but were still wary of a civilian govern-
ment sticking its nose in their affairs. Or, it could
appease the generals and acquiesce to their demands for more
influence and control over Spain's internal affairs, especial-
ly with regard to civil order. In practice, the government's
response was a mixture of the two with more weight given to
appeasement than reform.
The handling of the coup conspirators is an excellent
example of the government's dual approach to the problem.
All told, thirty officers, including General Armada, Milan
del Bosch and Colonel Tejero were arrested in connection with
the coup. Charges against the two hundred members of the
Guardia Civil who took part in the seizure of the Cortes,
however, were dropped. Although the conspirators faced sen-
tences of up to thirty years, prosecution of those involved
has become a drawn out process. The actual courts martial
are not to take place until early next year despite public
demand for swift trials. [158] Meanwhile, the conspirators
have become heroes to many in the military and among the
Spanish political right who see them as true patriots moti-
vated by their love of Spain and their loyalty to the monarchy,
[159]
The need to maintain the Army's loyalty was reflected
at this summer's Armed Forces Day parade in Barcelona. An
event normally ignored by Spanish politicians and given scant
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coverage by the press, the parade was transformed by the
jumpy atmosphere that prevailed in Spain following the coup
into a major political event. As reported in the New York
Times
,
"Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo and virtually his entire
cabinet, keen to display their solidarity with the military,
moved for the weekend to Barcelona and dutifully attended
various martial demonstrations, mock landings, and solemn
pledges of allegiance to tlie Spanish flag," [161]
This is not to imply that the government ignored the
necessity to reform the armed forces. Immediately after the
coup, a number of military commands were revamped and loyal
generals shifted into command of key military posts. [162]
Furthermore, a new retirement law that had been under debate
for nearly three years, was finally passed by the Cortes and
signed into force by the King on July 23. This law lowered
the ages for officers to move to the reserve list and author-
ized the Defense Minister to transfer officers even if they
did not request such reassignment. [163]
The retirement law will not have much immediate impact
on the military hierarchy, since full implementation of its
provisions will take several years. However, it will grad-
ually alleviate the military's top-heavy rank structure.
Another statute of significance, passed by the Cortes in
the aftermath of the February coup, is a state of emergency
law. This law, which governs the states of alert, emergency
and siege, grants the government significant powers, such as
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the suspension of constitutional liberties, in the event of
future crises. Use of the law, however, must have the approval
of the Cortes, and the civilian government, not the military,
will assume all special powers laid down by the law, thereby
ensuring that the civil sector retains authority whatever
the situation. [164]
In an effort to redefine the Army's mission away from a
strictly internal role, Calvo Sotelo has accelerated Spain's
application to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Joining NATO has been part of the government's plan to inte-
grate Spain into Western Europe. It is a devisive political
issue in Spain, with the PCS and PSOE strongly opposed to
Spanish membership. Behind the debate lie questions concern-
ing Spain's place in Europe, its geographical role, relations
with the United States and the status of Gibraltar. What is
important here, however, are the implications of NATO member-
ship for the Spanish military, particularly the Army.
NATO enthusiasts in Spain, principally in the UCD , have
argued that membership will bring modernization of equipment,
joint maneuvers, and other contracts with the professional
armies of Western Europe that will give Spanish generals more
positive preoccupations than "bemoaning Basque terrorism",
or plotting the "salvation of the fatherland". [165] Social-
ist detractors, on the other hand, argue that NATO membership
would not necessarily be an effective defense against a
future army coup. They note that Portugal under Salazar and
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Greece under the Colonels were NATO members and that NATO
membership provided little deterrent to the generals in
Turkey. [166]
The Spanish Navy is a highly professional force that could
easily assume a mission in defense of NATO's southern flank,
and the Air Force, though small, is modern and capable. The
Spanish Army, on the other hand, deployed in a primarily
internal security role, would make little contribution to the
NATO mission. It is not surprising, therefore, that officers
of the Spanish Air Force and Navy tend to favor NATO member-
ship, while the Army has been less happy about that prospect,
with less technically skilled junior officers and senior
officers of the Franco mold particularly hostile to the idea.
[167]
The hostility of some army officers to NATO membership
for Spain centers around two basic concerns. In the first
place, many senior officers indoctrinated under Franco believe
that the Army's first priority is the preservation of the
Spanish state. They are not thrilled at the prospect of
taking the Army out of its internal security role. For these
officers, it is easier to see a threat to Spain coming from
within the country than from without. Secondly, the Army as
a whole is worried that NATO membership would force a more
realistic evaluation of Spanish defense priorities with a
resultant increase in Navy and Air Force budgets and a cor-
responding decrease in the Army's, thus contributing to a
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growing fsar among many officers that the Army's centrality
to the affairs of the nation is diminishing. [16 8]
Nonetheless, Calvo Sotelo has been successful in getting
Spain's NATO application approved by parliament despite oppo-
sition from a faction of the military and by the Socialist
and Communist parties who demand that the issue be decided
by national referendum. During the first week of December,
1981, Spain formally submitted its application to the NATO
council. NATO membership for Spain, is expected to be
quickly approved by the organization's members. Whether this
will, in fact, take the Army out of politics remains to be
seen. As Meir Serfaty suggests, however, "it is unlikely
that the power of the Army will be greatly diminished in a
country where intervention is both traditionally and consti-
tutionally possible (through Article eight) and where the
Army, if not the police, still enjoys a great deal of pres-
tige." [169]
The government's argument that NATO membership would
define a new mission for the Army stands in sharp contrast
to the government's new anti-terrorism offensive declared in
March 19 81. In response to a renewed wave of violence in-
stigated by the ETA-M, which included the murder of two Army
colonels, the government attempted to defuse tension among
the nation's military by enlisting the anned forces in the
fight against terrorism. In doing so, it supported the Army's
domestic mission and reaffirmed the Army's traditional role
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of guaranteeing the internal security of the nation. Nonethe-
less, military units were dispatched to the northern region
to seal the border with France, behind which Spanish author-
ities claimed Basque terrorists took refuge after staging
their attacks. Navy units patrolled the coast while Army
commandos guarded the mountain passes of the Pyrenees.
The decision to incorporate the military in the Basque
terrorist fight created a justifiable impression that the
government had acquiesced in the principal demands of those
right-wing officers responsible for the February coup attempt,
Furthermore, the measure could very well play onto the ETA's
hands by alienating the Basque population and by providing
increased opportunity for ETA attacks against the military.
Nonetheless, all major political parties in Spain condemned
the ETA and supported the government's strong anti-terrorist
stand, for it became painfully apparent during the aftermath
of the February coup that the problem must be resolved if
Spain's democratic viability was to be ensured. Even Carlos
Garaicoectexa gave his cautious support to the measure after
receiving government assurances that the Army would not be
employed in the interior of the Basque country and would not
fight the terrorists directly. [170]
In addition to incorporating the military into its anti-
terrorism offensive, the Spanish government renewed pressure
on France to assist in its fight against the ETA. The gov-
ernment hoped that French President Francois Mitterand' s new
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socialist government would track down and extradite ETA
terrorists taking refuge in France. The previous government
of Giscard d' Estaing had been uncooperative on this issue,
fearing that a crackdown on the French side of the Pyrenees
would alienate French Basques and provoke ETA violence on
French soil. Despite pressures from Madrid, the French have
yet to agree to an extradition arrangement with Spain, but
have pledged to pursue crimes committed by Basque separatists
on French soil. They have also assigned additional police
forces to duty on the Spanish border. [171]
One aspect of the terrorist problem that the government
has so far neglected to address is the continuing problems
of the Guardia Civil. If there is one factor that still
unites Basques, it is their common hatred of this paramili-
tary group who are still regarded as members of an occupying
army.
The Guardia Civil once again embarassed the government
this summer as a result of the so called "Almeria case" . In
short, three young men, mistakenly identified as ETA terror-
ists, were apparently tortured and then murdered by Guardia
Civil members who then faked an automobile accident to cover
up the incident. The credibility of Calvo Sotelo's government
suffered a serious blow when the Interior Minister persisted
with an official version of how the three men died which
closely followed the Guardia Civil cover story. The incident
rapidly assumed national proportions, given the Guardia
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Civil' s role in the February coup. The ability of the govern-
ment to control its security forces was once more questioned.
Eventually, the commander of the Guardia Civil garrison in
Almeria and two other members of the force were arrested and
charged with manslaughter. The damage was done, however, as
people began to fear that the fight against terrorism was
getting out of hand, with police methods threatening innocent
citizens' lives. [172] As long as the government is re-
luctant to reform its internal security forces, incidents of
this type will continue to give new life to ETA terrorism
and short circuit any attempt to restore law and order in the
Basque region.
In sum, the government of Calvo Sotelo has pursued a
mixed program of reform and appeasement in its efforts to
defuse the threat of a military coup in Spain. One could
argue that the military got what it wanted in the wake of
the February coup especially with regards to the terrorist
problem. To eliminate the threat of a future coup, however,
and to keep the military out of politics, a strong government
with solid democratic institutions supporting is required.
Conversely, the perception of a weak and divided government
incapable of running the affairs of the nation will surely
tempt the Spanish military to take matters into its own
hands
.
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VI. CONCLUSION: THE VIABILITY OF SPANISH DEMOCRACY
At the present time (December 19 81) , the viability of
Spanish democracy remains uncertain as rumors of another coup
attempt continued to circulate in Spain. [173] These rumors
persist despite the fact that Basque terrorism - the Achilles'
heel of Spanish democracy - is at a new low. From January
to November of this year there have been "only" thirty-three
deaths resulting from terrorism compared to one hundred and
twenty for the same period last year, and since June, only
five deaths have occurred, indicating that the government's
fight against terrorism is finally showing results. [174]
Although numerous arrests and police roundups have
largely dismantled the terrorist organizational structure,
it is also apparent that a growing social rejection of the
ETA, as a result of the approaching reality of Basque auto-
nomy, has taken the wind out of separatism. Continued
progress toward full implementation of the Basque autonomy
statute is imperative, however, if stability in the region
is to be guaranteed. Alarmed by February's coup, Basque
nationalist leaders took a low profile and accepted a slow-
down in the devolution process in order not to further pro-
voke the military. They continue to cite, however, the
need for the Basque government to become directly involved
in sorting out the terrorist problem. Specifically, they
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emphasize the need for an indegenous Basque police force to
replace the hated Guardia Civil. Although the government
has agreed to this demand, a complete changeover promises to
be a drawn out process and will probably take up to five
years to complete. [175]
Meanwhile, the ETA remains a source of danger to Spain's
democracy even though its activity has been drastically
curtailed. On October 2, 19 81, for example, an ETA bomb
blew a hole in the side of a Spanish destroyer docked in
Santander harbor. Fortunately, no lives were lost although
the bomb could have taken scores if it had touched off the
ship's magazine. Heavy casualties aboard the destroyer would
probably have been successful in provoking the military.
[176]
A major concern of Spanish democrats has been the growth
of the Spanish far-right in the aftermath of the February
coup. As mentioned previously, Colonel Tejero and the other
coup conspirators have become heroes to francoists and other
right-wing sympathizers in Spain. It has been reported, for
instance, that some conservative military officers have been
raising funds for the families of those men under arrest.
[177] Furthermore, on the sixth anniversary of Franco's
death this past November, nearly three hundred thousand
Spaniards, offering the fascist salute and shouting demands
for Tejero's freedom, packed the square in front of the
Royal Palace in Madrid at a rally led by Bias Pinar, the
head of the ultra-right New Force Party. [178]
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Emboldered by the coup attempt and what they perceive to
be government acquiescence to the conspirators ' demands , the
far-right has kept alive talk of a military government in
Spain. The far-right's rhetoric centers around the supposi-
tion that democracy is the fundamental cause of Spain's pres-
ent problems and the expectation that the army will have to
do something to save General Armada, General Milans del Bosch
and Colonel Tejero, who are still awaiting their courts
martial. [179] With the growth of a more vocal and assertive
right, one can expect the conspirators' trials to raise the
political temperature of the nation.
What is more likely to trigger a military coup at the
present time than either Basque terrorism of far-right acti-
vism is the growing perception that the government has lost
the capacity to govern. In recent months, it has become
apparent that Spain's main political parties have forgotten
the King's post-coup appeal for common sense and cooperation.
In November, the King urged politicians to mend their ways.
"In order to retain public respect", he warned, "politics
must not degenerate into inefficiency, bureaucratic immobility
and feuding" - which is a fair description of the Spanish
political scene during the past six months. [180]
One might question, for example, the wisdom of dividing
the country at this time over the NATO issue. NATO member-
ship, which would probably appear irrelevant to most Spaniards,
who believe their country faces more pressing social and
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economic problems, has, nonetheless, been politicized by the
socialist left into a major issue used to mobilize the popu-
lace against the Calvo Sotelo government. [131]
Furthermore, the UCD has been plagued by an eroding pub-
lic image, political infighting and internal divisions which
have raised serious doubts about the present government's
survivability. With the exception of its anti- terrorist
campaign, the Calvo Sotelo government has not appeared aggres-
sive in tackling Spain's problems. It has been lax in deal-
ing with Spain's troubled economy and has had difficulty in
devising a comprehensive economic program to deal with in-
flation, unemployment, and the problems associated with
Spain's uneven economic development. The economic condition
of the Basque country is an important variable in the stability
equation that the government is trying to formulate for that
region. Basque industries, especially steel and shipbuilding,
are in serious trouble, and Basque unemployment, at twenty
percent, is well above the national average of twelve to
fourteen percent. [182] It is essential, therefore, that
Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo follow up on his promise of new
investment in the Basque economy if a measure of stability
is to be achieved in the region.
.
In addition, scandal has continued to rock the government.
Adulterated cooking oil, reported to have killed 120 people
and to have harmed 11,000 others this past summer and in-
fected pork sold in northeastern Spain caused a public outcry
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which brought charges of corruption and cover up against the
government along with calls for the Health Minister's dis-
missal. [183]
The government was further shaken in September by the
resignation of Justice Minister Francisco Ordonez, who was
unhappy with the government's shift to the right. In November,
Ordonez along with sixteen other parliamentarians of the
social democrat wing of the party left the UCD to establish
their own Democratic Action Party. [184]
By the end of November the UCD was in serious danger of
breaking up. While Suarez firmly believed that the UCD should
remain in the center of Spain's political spectrum, Prime
Minister Calvo Sotelo has favored a more homogeneous, con-
servative position for the party and the government. This
led to left-right cleavages within the party which resulted
in Ordonez' defection and the defection of four right-wing
deputies who disagreed with the government over its policies
of devolution and divorce.
One politician who has gained from this governmental
crisis is Manuel Fraga, leader of the right-wing Popular
Alliance (AP) which was the surprise winner in the Galicia
regional election this Fall. Fraga' s formula for a stable
Spain is a "grand right" based on his own small but growing
party and the right wing of the UCD. It is. argued by the
Right, that a "natural alliance" of this kind would please
the military and reconcile doubting officers to democracy.
[185]
115

In sum, the greatest immediate danger to Spanish democracy
is posed by the instability of the present government. A
collapse of the UCD government would mean an early election
which would probably favor Felipe Gonzalez and the PSOE,
although Fraga's AP could be expected to make significant
gains. The question is whether the Spanish military would
tolerate an election in which a socialist outcome is a dis-
tinct possibility. Would such an election prompt the military
to stage another coup to pre-empt possible socialist gains?
King Juan Carlos remains the strongest political figure
in Spain and is the cornerstone upon which Spanish democracy
presently rests. For the present, he still retains the
military's loyalty and thus has the power and the influence
to keep the generals in their place. The King apparently
recognizes the dangers ahead and has pressured his Prime
Minister to get his government in order. In response, Calvo
Sotelo recently ousted Rodriquez Sahagan, a close friend of
Suarez, from the presidency of the UCD and took the job
himself. Calvo Sotelo is now putting together a new
ministerial team which is expected to be to the right-of-
center one willing to seek an understanding with Fraga's
Popular Alliance if it becomes necessary to keep his govern-
ment in power. [13 6]
The Spanish military has emerged from the February coup
with its influence intact if not enhanced. The interests
of the military weigh heavily on the minds of civilian
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politicians whose efforts to keep the generals pacified have
given them a "silent" veto in many areas of national policy.
As one socialist legislator remarked following the February
coup attempt. "We now have three chambers in the Cortes:
the Congress, the Senate, and the Joint Chiefs of the General
Staff". [187]
The integration of Spain into Western Europe is predica-
ted upon the continued success of its democratic evolution.
A return to a rightist, military dictatorship would be
detrimental to this goal and would therefore not serve the
American interest as fully as a democracy even if American
base facilities were retained. The ideological versus
security motivations in U.S. foreign policy toward Spain will,
one hopes, be resolved by the construction of a strong
Spanish democracy fully cooperative in guaranteeing general
western security interests.
The ultimate guarantee of Spanish democracy depends upon
the strength of its democratic institutions. Spain has
undergone a remarkable and dramatic change during the past
six years, but it will take time for these institutions to
take root in Spanish society. Until then, however, Spain's
democracy remains susceptible to forces rooted in its
authoritarian past.
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